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 Summary 
EU competition law is the safeguard of the functioning of the internal 
market, and not many fields of law other than patent law can delimit the 
scope of competition law. A patent’s value is based upon an exclusive right 
to the invention and product as protected by the patent. The value stems 
from the monopoly to the market, namely, an exclusiveness to produce, 
market, offer and sell the product for a limited time-period. Such an 
exemption from competition law is unique, and the intersection of the two 
fields of law creates a dynamic field that nurses a competitive market. 
 
A pharmaceutical patent is unique in its character and position in relation to 
other patents. It is only within the sphere of pharmaceutical patents where 
an already known and previously patented active substance can be protected 
multiple times. The possibility stems from the exemption to novelty in the 
EPC, known as second medical use. Second medical use patents have 
recently caused a stir around EU when utilised in infringement proceedings 
against generic companies, producing products to compete with the 
originally patented product, i.e. the reference medicinal product.  
 
Skinny labelling stimulates competition on the market of the reference 
medicinal product. Simplified, a skinny label is when the indication that is 
protected by a second medical use patent has been erased from, e.g., the 
label, leaflet or packaging. Such a removal facilitates the launch of generic 
products on the reference medicinal product’s market without infringing the 
valid second medical use patent. Skinny labelling is consequently a direct 
articulation of the balance struck between competition law and patent law.  
 
Since the patented and generic products are based on the same active 
substance, substitution is possible based on the active substance. Such 
substitution has occurred, and led lawsuits around Europe. Relevant 
questions arising from such substitution, and following lawsuits, are (i) can 
the patent holder of a second medical use patent righteously claim 
infringement of its patent by the generic product, and file a lawsuit against 
the generic pharmaceutical company, and (b) could such an infringement 
proceeding against the generic pharmaceutical company constitute an 
abusive expansion of the patent’s scope of protection, and consequently 
violate Article 102 TFEU?   
 
The dynamics of EU competition law and patent law is a rather well 
scrutinised area of law, but the problem of skinny labelling shines some 
light on new aspects of the intersection that needs to be clarified and settled. 
The thesis is studying the possible limitation imposed on a second medical 
use patent holder when scrutinising the problem from a competition law 
perspective.  A balance must be struck between the two fields of law and 
there are different solutions to find such equilibrium, and this thesis 
provides one of them.   
 Sammanfattning 
Den EU-rättsliga konkurrensrätten har till syfte att skydda den inre 
marknaden och dess funktion, och det är inte många andra rättsområden 
utom patenträtten som kan avgränsa dess tillämpningsområde. Värdet i ett 
patent ligger i den försäkran om ensamrätt till uppfinningen som är 
patentskyddad. Värdet härrörs från patentinnehavarens monopol till 
marknaden och ensamrätten till att producera, marknadsföra, utbjuda och 
sälja produkten. Detta undantag från konkurrensrättens tillämpningsområde 
är unikt för patenträtten, och brytpunkten mellan de båda skapar ett 
dynamiskt område som värnar en marknad som är konkurrenskraftig.  
 
Läkemedelspatent har en säregen ställning och utformning jämfört med 
andra patentområden. Det är enbart inom läkemedelspatent som en redan 
tidigare känd och patenterad substans kan patenteras igen. Undantaget från 
nyhetskravet är fastställt i EPC, och är känt som en andra medicinsk 
indikation. Sådana patent har skapat uppståndelse runt om i EU i det senaste 
då de använts i intrångsåtal mot generiska läkemedelsföretag som ämnat 
producera läkemedel för att konkurrera med det tidigare patenterade 
läkemedlet, i.e. referens läkemedlet.  
 
Skinny labelling genererar konkurrens på marknaden för referens 
läkemedlet. Ett skinny label är då den andra medicinska indikationen, som 
fortsatt är patenterad, tas bort från exempelvis generikans märke, 
bipacksedel eller paket. Genom att ta bort den fortsatt patentskyddade 
indikationen så kan generikan konkurrera med referens läkemedlet marknad 
utan att göra intrång i det fortsatt giltiga andra medicinska 
indikationspatentet. Därav är skinny labelling ett direkt uttryck för ett försök 
att finna balansen mellan patenträtten och konkurrensrätten.  
 
Produkterna är baserade på samma aktiva substans och därav utbytbara. Det 
är just utbytbarheten som har gett upphov till stämningsansökningarna runt 
om i Europa. Relevanta frågor som uppstår vid sådant utbyte är (a) kan en 
patenrättsinnehavare till ett andra indikationspatent rättmätigt hävda att ett 
intrång har skett av den generiska produkten, och därav väcka talan mot 
generika företaget, och (b) skulle en sådan intrångstalan mot det generiska 
läkemedelsföretaget kunna anses vara en skadlig expansion av patentets 
skyddsomfång och därav anses vara en överträdelse av Artikel 102 av 
Europeiska funktionsfördraget? 
 
Balansen mellan EU-konkurrensrätten och patenträtten är ett relativt 
välutredd rättsområde, men skinny labelling lyfter nya aspekter att diskutera 
och förtydligas. Uppsatsen utreder den potentiella begränsning som kan 
åläggas patentinnehavare till andra medicinska indikationspatent då 
problemet belyses ur ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv. En balans mellan 
dem båda måste hittas, och det finns olika lösningar för att hitta en sådan 
brytpunkt. Denna uppsats redogör för en av dem.  
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
Patent law and competition law are two areas of law that are of vital 
importance to the European Union (“EU”) and its economic development. 
Whilst competition law protects the free movement of goods and services 
and keeps competition undistorted, patent law shields inventions from 
infringements, i.e. the entry of a competing product on the market. The two 
might seem as conflicting but creates, when balanced, a dynamic market. 
 
Patent law is, internationally, a semi-harmonized area of law. The first 
international convention on patent was the Paris Convention1, signed and 
ratified 1883 with now 176 contacting parties.2 Most national legislators 
have used the Paris Convention as guidance, and the Paris Convention is 
the backbone of international treaties and conventions. Patent law is not 
harmonised by EU law. However, international conventions, to which all 
Member States are signatories, have streamlined the Member States’ 
national legislation on patents. All Member States of the EU are members to 
the European Patent Office (“EPO”) and the European Patent Convention3 
(“EPC”), an extensive collaboration on patents. EPO is not incorporated in 
the EU system, but is causing indirect harmonisation of Member States’ 
patent systems since the EPC prescribes that all signatories must utilise 
EPC’s principles of patentability in their national patent law.4 Consequently, 
the difference between the EU Members States is the approach taken by the 
national courts to infringement and revocation claims. However, such 
differentiation can be troublesome. 
 
EU competition law is a fully harmonised area of EU law and has since the 
early years of the Coal and Steal Union been developing. The Union’s 
objective was to prevent war by establishing a common market for goods 
                                                
1 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last revised at Stockholm, 
21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 305 (“Paris Convention”). 
2 See WIPO, Contracting parties to the Paris Convention. 
3 European Patent Convention, 15th edition September 2013 (“EPC”). For the previous 
version, see, Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, 5 
October 1973, entry into force 7 October 1977 (“EPC 1973”). 
4 See Part II Chap I EPC. See also Article 4quater Paris Convention; Article 27 (1) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL 
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (“TRIPs”). First, 
the invention must be new to the market, secondly, it must consist of an innovative step 
and, lastly, that it is capable of industrial application.  
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with free movement over the borders. 5 The first step towards EU was taken 
by the establishing of institutions in a supranational manner, such as the 
Court of Justice and the High Authority. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (“CJEU”), who made famous rulings in the 60’s and 70’s 
such as the Hoffman-La Roche6 and Consten & Grundig7, early ruled on the 
dynamic of EU competition law and intellectual property law. The objective 
of the EU, as stated in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union8 (“TEU”), 
is an internal market with “highly competitive social market economy”. The 
CJEU has further held that the main objective of the internal market is an 
open market with undistorted competition, only limited by objective 
justifications.9 
 
Inventions are essential for the EU in order to be able to compete globally. 
This is acknowledged in Europe 202010 where the Commission proposes the 
target to reinvest 3 % of EU’s GDP in research and development in order 
for the EU to evolve into an “Invention Union”.11 
 
A patent’s importance stems from the protection of the exclusive rights to 
an invention. The exclusive rights constitute an incentive for innovators to 
invent by the return that the exclusive right to the commercial use of the 
invention awards them. The costs, risks and time effort to innovate would be 
too high without such a protection. Various EU treaties safeguard patent law 
and other intellectual property rights. Article 17 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union12 (“CFREU”) stipulates that 
“[i]ntellectual property shall be protected” and Article 36 of the Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union13 (“TFEU”) constitutes that the 
protection of intellectual property is exempted from the prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions. Such provision expresses a limitation on the scope 
of competition. However, the protection for intellectual property extends 
even further. Article 118 TFEU prescribes that, in the context of ensuring 
the establishing and functioning of the internal market, intellectual property 
right shall be provided with a uniform protection throughout the EU. 
 
                                                
5 See Paul Craig & Gráinne De Burca, G., EU Law: Text, cases and materials (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp 4 ff.  
6 Judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, 1979 461 (“Hoffmann-La 
Roche”). 
7 Judgment in Consten & Grundig v Commission, C-56/64, 1966 429 (“Consten & 
Grundig”). 
8 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 13–390 
(“TEU”). 
9 Judgment in Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission, Case 6/72, 1973 215, 
para 26 (“Continental Can”); Judgment in France Télécom SA v Commission, Case 
C-202/07 P, ECR I-2369, (“France Télécom SA”) para 105. 
10 EUROPE 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 
2020 final, 3 March 2010 (“EUROPE 2020”). 
11 Ibid, p 5. 
12 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–
407 (”CFREU”). 
13 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, p. 47–390 (“TFEU”). 
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Pharmaceutical patents form a category of patent law of significant 
importance, and are distinctive from all other patents by their nature. The 
same active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”) can be patented multiple 
times thanks to the concept of first and second medical use patents. A 
second medical use patent grants a patent for the discovery of that an 
already protected API can be used to treat another disease, i.e. to treat 
another indication.14 Consequently, second medical use patent is privileged 
with an eased novelty prerequisite.  
 
The acceptance of a second medical use patents creates an overlap in the 
time of single right to use the substance in part, since the protection of it is 
prolonged even if in somewhat with narrower scope. Skinny labelling is 
levelling the playfield between patent right holders and generic producing 
pharmaceutical companies. A generic product is a chemically identical and 
equivalent product to the previously patent protected product. A generic 
product launched with a skinny label has excluded the patented indication 
from its label, packaging, leaflet etc. in order not to infringe the valid patent 
of the second medical use product. Consequently, the evasion of patent 
infringement stems from not actively marketing the generic pharmaceutical 
and excluding information that might indicate substitutability.  
 
The tension between competition law’s undistorted market and patent law’s 
exclusivity to patented products is, however, noticeable when examining the 
case law on the concept of skinny labelling. Skinny labelling is in its 
simplicity the balance of the two fundamental rights of the EU: the right to 
property and the right to conduct business. The utopia is that the two realms 
of law harmoniously coexist and limit each other.  
 
The patent holder’s exclusive right is exempted from competition rules in 
order to stimulate invention. However, EU competition law – if used in an 
abusive manner by a dominant undertaking – limits patent law. There have 
been some adjudications by Member States’ courts on skinny labelling, all 
giving contrarious rulings. However, there are indications that more disputes 
are emerging. None of the judgments is discussing the aspect of the 
restraints that competition law and Article 102 TFEU might impose on a 
patent holder. Such lack of acknowledgement of the complexity of the 
problem is a shortage inherent in the all examined judgments. Hence, it is of 
importance to examine skinny labelling in the light of not only patent law, 
but also EU competition law. 
  
                                                
14 See Article 54(4) and (5) EPC. See Chapter 2.4 for a more detailed examination.  
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1.2 Purpose 
The advancement of skinny labelling cases around the globe, as well as the 
rising number of cases in the EU, amplifies the importance to address the 
potential clash between patent law and competition law. For example, a 
second medical use patent must enjoy the full protection for its discovery of 
the new use, but should remain limited to the indication as such. Moreover, 
a generic product to the originally patented product on the API, i.e. the 
reference medicinal product, must enjoy the protection of competition law 
and be able to enter the market without restraints to market, offer, import, 
produce and sell its product.  
 
The thesis studies the dynamic of EU competition law and pharmaceutical 
product’s granted patent protection. The limitation that Article 102 TFEU 
imposes on a second medical use patent holder – and the consequences such 
a limitation results in if the patent holder claims infringement of the patent –
will be scrutinised. The basic problem is the substitutability of the two 
pharmaceutical products. The two pharmaceuticals might be interchanged 
and the generic product dispensed for the medications as protected by the 
second medical use patent by a third party even if the protected indication 
was carved out from e.g. the list of contents, the packaging or the leaflet. An 
indication is the symptom that the substance aims at treating. 
 
The thesis will focus on discussing two interrelated questions, namely  
 
- Can the patent holder of a second medical use patent righteously 
claim infringement of its patent by the generic product, and file a 
lawsuit against the generic pharmaceutical company?  
- Could such an infringement proceeding against the generic 
pharmaceutical company constitute an abusive expansion of the 
patent’s scope of protection, and consequently violate Article 102 
TFEU?   
 
1.3 Method 
The thesis is examining how EU competition law can restrict a patent 
holder’s rights granted by a second medical use patent. Consequently, the 
thesis will apply a EU competition law perspective to the addressed conflict 
of law, rather than a patent law perspective. Such perspective is more 
appropriate in relation to the problem area and to answer the posed 
questions in a concise and clear manner. This study consists of mainly two 
sections, namely, a descriptive section and an analytic section. In order to 
accomplish an adequate scrutiny of the legal situation, an in-depth 
examination of the fields of patent and EU competition law must first be 
made before a well-founded discussion and analysis can be conducted. Such 
a critical discussion will include both law and case law, mainly stemming 
from the CJEU and EU but also EPO and its Boards of Appeal.  
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The general method applied to this thesis is the legal dogmatic method. The 
method seeks to clarify and establish the meaning of the applicable law or 
the researched and specified field of law. In regard of this thesis, the 
relevant field of law is the intersection of EU competition law and patent 
law, and specified to the dynamics of EU competition law and the use of 
second medical use patents. The method is the means to interpret the 
universally recognised sources of law, i.e. legislation, preparatory work, 
case law and legal doctrine.15 However, EU law is superior to the national 
legislation when primary law or secondary EU law has been implemented in 
the Member State.16  
 
Due to the EU law perspective as applied to the study, the EU legal method 
must also be regarded. The method establishes the norm hierarchy of EU 
law and is of vital importance in order to understand the legal system as 
discussed in this thesis. The superior norm in the hierarchy is primary law, 
such as the TEU and TFEU.  Next is secondary EU law and principles of 
law. The law of the CJEU is subordinated the secondary law, and followed 
by the travaux préparatoires, the Opinion of the Advocate General and, 
lastly, the legal doctrine.17 
 
The thesis will be, to a certain extent, interdisciplinary in the sense that 
policy documents and arguments as such will be scrutinised and applied in 
the discussion and analysis. This is a part of the EU that cannot be 
overlooked, especially not when assessing why certain regulations come 
into play. Such policy arguments are often articulated in the preamble of EU 
regulations and directives. Due to the incorporation in the legislative 
documents, such objectives are occasionally utilised when interpreting 
legislative documents.  
 
1.4 Materials 
The published literature on skinny labelling is not extensive, and mainly 
limited to articles in legal papers and blogs on intellectual property law. 
However, the dynamic of competition law and intellectual property law has 
been studied and especially so when concerns patents.  
 
The basis for the study is the competition provisions prescribed by the 
TFEU and the guiding principles of Union law, such as proportionality and 
non-discrimination. Secondary law documents, such as regulations and 
directives are also discussed both within the field of competition law and 
                                                
15 See Fredric Korling & Mauro Zamboni, Juridisk metodlära (Studentlitteratur, 2013), pp 
21 ff; Bengt Lehrberg, Praktisk juridisk metod (Iusté, 7th ed, 2014), p 203; Aleksander 
Peczenik, Juridikens teori och metod: en introduktion till allmän rättslära (Fritze, 1995), 
pp 17f; pp 35 ff. 
16 See Christian Dahlman, Rätt och rättfärdigande (Studentlitteratur, 2011), pp 21 ff. 
17 See Jörgen Hettner & Ida Otken-Eriksson, EU-rättslig metod – teori och genomslag i 
svensk rättstillämpning (Norstedts Juridik, 2nd ed, 2011), pp 40ff; p 188 f. 
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within the emerging field of EU patent law. International conventions and 
agreements will be scrutinised to the extent necessary. Such conventions are 
e.g. the EPC and the Agreement of a Unified Patent Court. Case law 
stemming both from the CJEU, Member States’ courts and international 
organisations decision-making bodies will be scrutinised and analysed.  
 
The thesis will study and apply numerous competition law judgments by the 
CJEU. Case law such as Consten & Grundig18, Hoffmann-La Roche v 
Centrafarm 19 and IMS Health v NDC Health20 will be scrutinised and 
constitute the framework of discussion. However, the main case of study 
will be Astra Zeneca v Commission21.  
 
The case law stemming from the Boards of Appeal of the EPO will also be 
scrutinised to establish the current general principles of patent law. 
Presently, such case law is the precedence of patent law in Europe. There is 
not an extensive pool of adjudications on skinny labelling, but the disputes 
are emerging. This thesis is examining and analysing three selected national 
court judgments on skinny labelling and second medical use patents.  
 
As abovementioned, the material on skinny labelling, and to some extent 
pharmaceutical patents, is finite and mainly based on Internet sources such 
as blogs and articles. The main publishers of articles and other materials are 
law firms. Even if such material is given an objective outlook, one must stay 
critical to such articles since they might have an underlying objective. 
Hence, the three judgments that are discussing skinny labelling will be 
utilised as the basis for the discussion and analysis on the dynamic of 
competition law and pharmaceutical patents. 
 
The legal doctrine is essential for a thorough examination of the problem-
area of the study. Consequently, the thesis will take into account and discuss 
the work of prominent scholars and practitioners in the field of EU 
competition law and intellectual property rights, such as Jonathan D.C. 
Turner, Guy Tritton, Marianne Levin and Bengt Domeij, among others. 
Such works will be utilised as a foundation for discussion and analysis.  
 
  
                                                
18 See Consten & Grundig, supra n 7. 
19 Judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche v Centrafarm, 102/77, 1978 1139 (“Hoffmann-La 
Roche v Centrafarm”). 
20 Judgment in IMS Health v NDC Health, C-418/01, ECR I-5039 (“IMS Health v NDC 
Health”). 
21 Judgment in AstraZeneca v Commission, C-457/10 P, e.r. (“AstraZeneca”). 
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1.5 Delimitations 
The thesis will be limited to study pharmaceutical patents in relation to 
Article 102 TFEU with a focus on the prerequisite abuse in order to assure 
an adequate and focused discussion of the posed questions. A focus on the 
intersection of EU competition law and patent law will be a necessity for a 
sufficient discussion on if the limitation of a patent holder’s right is 
acceptable and justified by the objectives of EU law.  
 
In order to conduct an eloquent discussion on EU law and pharmaceutical 
patents, certain aspects from other sources of law other than Article 102 
TFEU must also be mentioned, even if done so in brief. The study will 
therefore examine the EU directives on public procurement and the 
remedies available for an aggrieved party. Two new procurement directives 
were published in 2014 repealing the previous ones from 2004. The study is 
based on the new directives and the provisions prescribed there within. 
Public procurement is a vital part of the pharmaceutical sector, and 
consequently of importance for this study. Authorities purchase 
pharmaceuticals through procurement procedures, and public procurement is 
the ultimate form to ensure that the market remains undistorted when 
authorities enter into transactions. However, the examination of EU 
procurement law will be held short, only discussing the fundamental 
principles of procurement law to the benefit of a concentrated discussion.  
 
It is inevitable to study the fundamental right as prescribed by the CFREU. 
However, these principles and rights will be discussed and examined 
continuously all through the thesis, rather than scrutinised in an own 
subchapter.22 This is also the main reason why the thesis will study and 
discuss Europe 2020. The policy document is the foundation of the ten 
years’ strategy of the EU and can give guidance on the purpose of all 
legislation stemming from later than its publishing. The correct 
understanding of Europe 2020 is as an interpretation tool, a tool that even 
the CJEU also utilises, but cannot be scrutinised in its entirety in the study.23 
 
As regards patent law, the study focuses on pharmaceutical patents and the 
use of skinny labelling by generic companies. The EU patent regulation, 
Unitary Patent Regulation24, is emerging. The study will examine the 
                                                
22 The scope and strength of the Article 16 CFREU and the right to conduct business is 
thoroughly discussed in “Weak Right, Strong Court - The Freedom to Conduct Business 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights” by Xavier Groussot, Gunnar Tor Petursson & 
Justin Pierce (2014) 01/2014 Lund University Legal Research Paper Series. See also 
Judgment in Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, Case C-70/10, ECR I-11959, para 47-49. Right to 
intellectual property cannot restrict right to conduct business if deemed under secondary 
law. 
23 See e.g. Opinion by Advocate General Kokott in Judgment in European Commission v 
Kingdome of the Netherlands, C-368/10, e.r., para 36; Judgment in Giersch and Others, C-
20/12, e.r., para 54. 
24 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection, OJ L 361, 31.12.2012, p. 1–8 (”Unitary Patent Regulation”). 
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regulation, and the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court25 (“UPC 
Agreement”) in order to establish what the future holds. It would be of little 
interest to examine skinny labelling in the sole aspect shadow of EPC when 
a new area of EU law is emerging. The future existence of a EU patent law 
system makes the question of how to find the equilibrium between patent 
law and competition law even more relevant.  
 
Even if the EU system of patent law is emerging, all of the existing case law 
is based on the regulations of EPO and the provisions of EPC. Naturally, the 
study must examine the patent system as provided under the EPC and 
discuss its impact on skinny labelling. For the sake of clarity, it must be 
pointed out that the EPC was modernised in 2000 and if not stated 
otherwise, by reference to EPC 1973, the use of the abbreviation EPC will 
refer to the version from 2000.   
 
The provisions regarding second medical use patents were amended by the 
introduction of the new EPC. Previous to the amendment, second medical 
use claims had been accepted by the case law of the EPO Boards of Appeal 
in contradiction to the actual wording of the EPC 1973 but are now accepted 
as valid patent claims under the new convention. However, the amendment 
changed the form of claims, from Swiss type claims to EPC 2000 claims. 
This change is essential for the study, and is therefore examined in a 
subchapter. The legal scholars and practitioners of Europe are disagreeing 
upon how the new wording of claims has affected the scope of protection. 
This could be a topic for a thesis in itself, and cannot possibly be covered by 
the scope of this thesis. The study on this specific issue is therefore limited 
to examining what the Boards of Appeals of the EPO has stated in its 
decisions.  
 
The second medical use and skinny label case law is limited to three 
different national courts’ decision adjudicating disputes on the same API, 
namely, pragabalin. The claimant is Warner-Lambert, a branch of the Pfizer 
group, who has filed lawsuits in multiple EU Member States for patent 
infringement of its second medical use patent. A British, a French and a 
German court adjudicate the examined decisions.  The focus of the 
examination to the same patent and the same claimant generates a 
possibility to contrast the different courts’ solutions to the dispute in an 
effective and interesting manner. The discussion and conclusions drawn 
from the judgments can be more concise and more balanced by such a 
limitation.  
 
  
                                                
25 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (“UPC Agreement”), OJ C 175, 20.6.2013, p. 1–
40. 
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1.6 Disposition  
The thesis is divided into two parts, one descriptive section and one 
analysing section. The second chapter, scrutinizing the EU competition law 
system, commences the descriptive section. This chapter focuses mainly on 
Article 102 TFEU and abuse of dominance, but also includes a brief closing 
subchapter on public procurement, and is meant to give the reader the 
knowledge necessary to analyse the intersection of competition and patent 
law. The subchapter on Article 102 TFEU focuses especially on the 
prerequisite abuse after a general introduction to the provision. A study of 
the AstraZeneca judgment is conducted in a separate subchapter.  
 
The third chapter examines the realm of patent law. The chapter consists of 
subchapters on the existence of patent law in the EU and the relevant 
aspects of patent law on pharmaceutical inventions. The chapters means to 
give the reader a basic knowledge of patent law in order to follow the 
discussion in the fourth and fifth chapter. The chapter is concluded by a 
study of the pregabalin judgments in the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. These judgments will be utilised as a foundation for the 
discussion and conclusions in the following chapters.  
 
The fourth chapter is devoted to the scrutiny and analysis of the intersection 
of EU competition law and patent law. The discussion takes its starting 
point in analysing the AstraZeneca judgment, followed by a scrutiny of the 
balance between the patent holder’s and the generic companies’ rights. Such 
an analysis will take its start in discussing the new type of second medical 
use claim, the EPC 2000 claim, which is followed by an in-depth discussion 
on the pregabalin judgments. The fourth chapter is concluded by a 
discussion on how to strike a balance between competition law, second 
medical use patent holders’ and generic companies’ objectives and rights as 
provided by EU law.  
 
The fifth chapter concludes the thesis with final remarks and conclusions on 
the findings from the discussion. 
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2 EU Competition law 
2.1 Introduction 
Competition law is a fully harmonised area of law within the EU. It is 
mandatory for national adjudicators to interpret their competition law in the 
light of the EU law. EU competition law strives to safeguard an open and 
competitive market. Competition law has multiple objectives. For example, 
one underlying objective is to establish economic efficiency and welfare.26 
Furthermore, the TEU articulates the strive to establish a highly competitive 
social market economy, as well as the objective to ensure that the internal 
market remains undistorted.27 
 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU are the substantive provisions of EU competition 
law. The two articles enforces and safeguards the functioning of the internal 
market, as held in the EcoSwiss v Benetton judgment.28 Article 101 TFEU is 
prohibiting the use of agreements for anticompetitive purposes. Such actions 
include price fixing, tying and bundling, and the use of rebates in a 
distortive manner.29 Article 102 TFEU regulates the behaviour of a 
dominant undertaking on the market. Conducts where a dominant 
undertaking abuses its position on the market are in violation of EU law.  
 
EU competition law is to some extent limited. EU law recognises the 
existence and right to property ownership.30 Article 36 TFEU exempts 
intellectual property rights from competition law’s applicability.31 
Consequently, the TFEU stipulates that free movement, and competition, 
can be restricted if justified to protect intellectual property rights.  
 
This chapter will study Article 102 TFEU with focus on the concept of 
abuse. The first subchapter will conduct a brief and general introduction to 
Article 102 TFEU followed by a scrutiny of the prerequisite abuse and the 
likelihood of intellectual property right to be utilised in an abusive manner. 
The chapter will, lastly, scrutinise the AstraZeneca v Commission judgment. 
                                                
26 See David Bailey & Vivien Rose (eds), Bellamy & Child: European Union Law of 
Competition (Oxford Uiversity Press, 5th ed., 2014), [1.013]. See also Judgment in 
TeliaSonera Sverige, C-52/09, ECR I-527, (“TeliaSonera”) para 22; Judgment in Roquette 
Frères, C-94/99, ECR I-11037, para 42. 
27 See Bailey & Rose, supra n 26, [1.011] – [1.012]. 
28 See Judgment in EcoSwiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV, C-126/97, ECR 
I-3055, para 36. 
29 See Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay (eds), Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2014), [3.24] – [3.26]. 
30 See Article 345 TFEU. 
31 Article 36 TFEU provides: ”The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude 
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of 
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic 
or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. (…)” 
11 
2.2 Article 102 TFEU 
2.2.1 General 
Article 102 TFEU reads as follows:  
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between 
Member States. (…) 
An undertaking must, in order to infringe Article 102 TFEU, fulfil four 
criteria. Firstly, it must be an undertaking; secondly, this undertaking must 
be in a dominant position on the relevant market; thirdly, the dominant 
undertaking must conduct an abusive behaviour; and fourthly and last, the 
abusive conduct must affect trade between Member States.  
 
The definition of an undertaking is the same in Article 101 and 102 TFEU, 
and has been defined by extensive case law.32 It was established in the 
judgment of Höfner that:33 
 
[i]t must be observed, in the context of competition law, first that the concept 
of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, 
regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed  
 
The decision on whether or not an entity is conducting an economic activity 
is based on functions performed by the entity and the characteristic features 
of the entity. The actual intent, or whether the entity is making profit or not 
is irrelevant. The characteristic features of an undertaking is that it offers 
goods and/or services to the market and that such an activity, at least 
hypothetically, can generate profit.34  
 
A dominant position has been defined by the CJEU in multiple cases. The 
CJEU define dominant position by its judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche as:35 
 
The dominant position (…) relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed 
by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and 
ultimately of the consumers.  
 
                                                
32 See Faull & Nikpay, supra n 29, [3.27]. 
33 See Judgment in Höfner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH, C-41/90, ECR I-1979, para 21. 
34 See Judgment in Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz, C-475/99, ECR I-
8089, para 19; Judgment in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, ECR I-6295, para 25; 
Judgment in Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, C-
67/96, ECR I-5751; Judgment in Pavlov v Stichtting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, 
Joined Cases C-180/98, C-181/98, C-182/98, C-183/98, C-184/98, ECR I-6451, para 201. 
35 See Hoffmann-La Roche, supra n 6, para 38. See also Judgment in United Brands v 
Commission, Case 27/76, 1978 207 (“United Brands”), para 65. 
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The Commission has established some guiding thresholds in their Guidance 
Paper36. The Guidance Paper is not legally binding, but provides 
undertakings with a greater clarity and predictability on how the 
Commission will deem certain conducts and market structures when it is 
conducting its investigation of a potential violation by undertakings. An 
undertaking with less than 40 % of the market-shares is assumed as not 
dominant.37 However, the thresholds are not absolute and can vary between 
markets, industries and products and it is underlined in the Guidance paper 
that the dominance must be assessed in relation to the relevant market.38 
Therefore, it is necessary to establish the relevant market of the undertaking.  
 
The market definition is “a tool to identify the boundaries of competition 
between firms.”39 The assessment of the relevant market is split up in a two-
step assessment: one on the product market and one on the geographical 
market. The product market must be established first in order to determine 
the geographical market. In order to do so, it must be established which 
products or services that are close to substitutes to the product or service in 
question. The objective is to identify the actual competitors that have the 
capacity to constrain the dominants undertaking’s behaviour on the 
market.40 
 
Products that are substitutable to the product of the dominant undertaking 
form the relevant product market.41 The substitutability is measured by the 
demand and supply substitution and cross-elasticity on the market.42 In the 
judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court stated the following regarding 
the relevant product market:43  
 
The concept of the relevant market in fact implies that there can be effective 
competition between the products which form part of it and this presupposes 
that there is a sufficient degree of substitutability between all the products 
forming part of the same market in so far as a specific use of such products is 
concerned. 
 
The test applied to measure the demand substitution is the SSNIP test. 
SSNIP stands for Small but Significant Increase in Price.44 The test is 
utilised worldwide in order to detect the relevant market and defines the 
                                                
36 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings (Text with EEA relevance), OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 7–20 (“Guidance 
Paper”). 
37 See Ibid III.A.14. 
38 See Ibid III.A.13. 
39 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997 (“Commission notice”), p. 5–13, [2]. 
40 See Ibid [10] – [12]. 
41 See Bailey & Rose, supra n 26, [4.027]. 
42 See Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law; Text, cases and materials 
(Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2014), pp 66 f.  
43 See Hoffmann-La Roche, supra n 6, para 28. See also Judgment in AKZO v Commission, 
C-62/86, ECR I-3359, para 51; Judgment in L’Oréal v De Nieuwe AMCK, Case 31/80, ECR 
3775, para 25; Judgment in Bronner v Mediaprint, C-7/97, ECR I-7817, para 33. 
44 See Jones & Sufrin, supra n 42, p 67. 
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relevant market by establishing the maximal profitable price a hypothetical 
monopolist could charge before its customer would change to another 
product. It is executed by the hypothetical increase of 5-10 % in price and 
examination of customers’ hypothetical behaviour to such a change. If the 
customers would switch to another available product, that substitutable 
product will be included in the relevant market. The test is conducted until a 
small but significant increase in price would remain profitable for the 
undertaking.45  Some other variables can be utilised to establish the relevant 
product market as well. For example, the product characteristics might erase 
the substitutability between the products,46 customers’ preferences can also 
make two fully substitutable products belong to two different markets,47 or 
the fact that it would be too costly for a customer to switch to another 
product, or other hindrance by other barriers to the market.48 
 
Whilst demand-side substitution focuses on how the consumer would react 
on a price increase, supply-side substitution focuses on the alternative 
suppliers that are active on the market. Such estimation is based on how 
many alternative suppliers that would reorganise its production, start to 
produce and sell products competing with the dominant undertaking’s 
product if the price were to be increased.49 The CJEU underlined in 
Continental Can that the supply-side substitution forms an essential part in 
the establishing of the relevant market.50 
 
The geographical market is defined by the assessment of market shares 
between the undertakings in different regions, the price differences and 
trade flows. The geographic market can be local, national, regional, EU-
wide or global.51 The judgment of United Brands52 set out that the 
geographic market is a “clearly defined geographic area in which [the 
product] is marketed and where the conditions of competition is sufficiently 
homogenous for the effect of economic power”.53  
 
Furthermore, the abusive behaviour must “may affect trade between 
Member States” in order to violate Article 102 TFEU. The conduct must 
disrupt the flow over the borders or interfere with the structure of the 
competition on the market to an appreciable extent.54 However, each 
element of the behaviour does not need to affect trade, it is the overall 
impact of the behaviour and the overall strategy that is assessed.55 It must be 
                                                
45 See Commission notice, supra n 39, [17]. 
46 See Hoffmann-La Roche, supra n 6, para 28. See also Bailey & Rose, supra n 26, [4.029]. 
47 See e.g. Judgment in CEAHR v Commission, Case T-427/08, ECR II-2805, para 90. See 
also Bailey & Rose, supra n 26, [4.032]. 
48 See Commission notice, supra n 39, [42]. See also Bailey & Rose, supra n 26, [4.033]. 
49 See Bailey & Rose, supra n 26, [4.046]. 
50 See Continental Can, supra n 9, [29]; [35]. 
51 See Commission notice, supra 39, para 28-31. 
52 See United Brands, supra n 35.  
53 See Ibid para 11. 
54 See Jones & Sufrin, supra n 42, pp 283 f.  
55 See Commission Notice - Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 81–96 
(”Commission guidelines”), p 17. 
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possible for the authorities to “foresee with a sufficient degree of probability 
(…) that the agreement or practice may have an influence, direct or indirect, 
on the pattern of trade”.56 It is not necessary that the conduct affects the 
whole of one Member State and the whole of another. A conduct can be 
deemed to be affecting trade between Member States even if it only affects a 
part of a Member State, “provided that the effect on trade is appreciable.”57  
 
2.2.2 The Concept of Abuse 
The essence of the prohibition of abusive conduct in Article 102 TFEU is to 
protect competition on the merits and to safeguard consumers. An 
undertaking using its dominance to foreclose the market and hinder 
competition on the merits is in breach of Article 102 TFEU. EU competition 
law does not prohibit dominant undertakings, as long as they compete on the 
merit. However, undertakings are penalised if distorting competition by the 
abuse of dominance.58 Abusive behaviour can be e.g. predatory pricing, 
entry barriers and exclusionary conducts.59  
 
The concept of abuse was defined by the CJEU in the judgment of 
Hoffmann-La Roche as:60 
 
the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to 
influence the structure of a market where , as a result of the very presence of 
the undertaking in question , the degree of competition is weakened and 
which , through recourse to methods different from those which condition 
normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators , has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition. 
 
The term abuse is an objective concept. It is not the use of a dominant 
position that is the essential prerequisite, but rather to which extent the 
effect of a conduct disrupts competition on the market and competition on 
the merits.61 The abuse is not dependent on the undertaking’s subjective 
intent.62 On that note, a conduct may be deemed abusive by the Commission 
even if the undertaking does not obtain any advantages from the conduct, 
financial or competitive.63 The definition of abuse, as previously 
established, was altered in 2012 by the judgment in Post Danmark.64  The 
CJEU added in the test of abuse that Article 102 TFEU “applies, in 
                                                
56 See Ibid p 23. 
57 See Ibid p 21. 
58 See Jones & Sufrin, supra n 42, pp 272 f. 
59 See Guidance paper, supra n 36, IV.A – D. 
60 See Hoffmann-La Roche, supra n 6, para 91. 
61 See Ibid. See also TeliaSonera, supra n 26, para 67; Judgment in Tomra v Commission, 
C-549/10 P, n.y.r., para 17; Opinion of Advocate General Kirschner in Judgment Tetra Pak 
Rausing SA v Commission, T-51/89, ECR II-309, para 64. 
62 See Judgment in Clearstream v Commission, T-301/04, ECR II-3155, para 142 – 144. 
63 See Judgment in SELEX v Commission, T-155/04, ECR II-4797, para 108. 
64 Judgment in Post Danmark, Case C-209/10, EU:C:2012:172. 
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particular to the conduct of a dominant undertaking, (…), that has the effect, 
to the detriment of the consumers, of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of competition”.65  
 
There is a possibility that a conduct can evade violation of Article 102 
TFEU. However, this requires that such an exemption can be objectively 
justified. According to case law and the Guidance Paper, two criteria must 
be met: the action taken by the dominant undertaking must be necessary, 
and it must achieve efficiency gains.66 The Guidance Paper sets out that the 
conduct must be “objectively necessary”, proportionate, and must be 
determined on the basis of external factors. An abusive conduct might be 
considered necessary for health and safety reasons. However, the 
Commission states firmly that:67 
 
proof of whether conduct of this kind is objectively necessary must take into 
account that it is normally the task of public authorities to set and enforce 
public health and safety standards. It is not the task of a dominant 
undertaking to take steps on its own initiative to exclude products which it 
regards, rightly or wrongly, as dangerous or inferior to its own product 
 
The dominant undertaking may evade the penalisation under Article 102 
TFEU if the effects arising from the conduct can be counterbalanced by 
advantages, which would also benefit the consumer, i.e. negative effects of 
the abuse might be overweight by efficiency gains from the conduct.68 
However, the Commission has set out four cumulative criteria to be 
fulfilled. Firstly, the conduct must relate to the actual conduct, secondly, the 
conduct must be indispensable for the efficiency gains realisation, thirdly, 
the gains must overweight all negative effects on competition and consumer 
welfare, and fourthly, the conduct cannot eliminate effective competition.69 
The dominant undertaking bears the burden of proof. However, the test for 
proving efficiency gains was defined and utilised by the CJEU in its recent 
Post Danmark II judgment. The CJEU stated that:70 
 
it is for the dominant undertaking to show that the efficiency gains likely to 
result from the conduct under consideration counteract any likely negative 
effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets, that 
those gains have been, or are likely to be, brought about as a result of that 
conduct, that such conduct is necessary for the achievement of those gains in 
efficiency and that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing 
all or most existing sources of actual or potential competition 
 
                                                
65 See Ibid para 44. 
66 See Guidance paper, supra n 36, [30]. 
67 See Ibid [29]. See also Judgment in Hilti v Commission, T-30/89, ECR II-1439 (“Hilti v 
Commission”), para 118 – 119; Judgment in Tetra Pak International v Commission (Tetra 
Pak II), T-83/91, ECR II-755, para 83 – 84; 138. 
68 See Judgment in Post Danmark II, C-23/14, 6 October 2015, n.y.r., (“Post Danmark II”), 
para 48; compare to Judgment in Post Danmark, supra n 64, para 42. See also judgments in 
British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, ECR I-2331, para 86; TeliaSonera, supra n 26, 
para 76. 
69 See Guidance paper, supra n 36, [30]. 
70 See Post Danmark II, supra n 68, para 49. 
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Intellectual property rights can be used in a manner that constitutes an 
abusive manner and, thus, penalised under Article 102 TFEU.71 Article 102 
TFEU has increased in significance after the Regulation 1/2003.72 Article 3 
Regulation 1/2003 states that national competition authorities must apply 
Article 102 TFEU to banned conducts under the article even in sole national 
matters. 
 
2.2.3 Abuse of dominance by use of intellectual 
property right 
Patents can enhance a dominant position and contribute as a factor to that 
the undertaking is found dominant on the market. However, the mere 
existence of such rights cannot in itself constitute a dominant position.73 The 
exercise of intellectual property rights is lawful, as long as in coherence 
with Article 36 TFEU, and cannot constitute an abuse in themselves.74  
 
There must be a clear link between the abusive use of the right and the 
dominant position of the undertaking in order for the intellectual property 
right to be an abuse.75 Intellectual property rights will most of the time 
amount to a barrier to market entry. However, it is of importance to 
differentiate between the foreclosure of the market due to the rightful use of 
the right and the barriers to entry due to abusive behaviour. A patent 
constitutes a part of the product but is not the product itself.76 Consequently, 
the market will be a bit bigger than the patent in most cases. 
 
It is not an abusive act to refuse to license or supply intellectual property in 
itself. However, it is abusive if the refusal prevents new products to enter 
the market or limits technical development to the expense of the consumers. 
CJEU affirmed this in the IMS Health v NDC Health judgment.77 
 
The dispute in IMS Health v NDC Health was based on the refusal to license 
copyright to a competitor, and whether that could be considered abuse of 
dominance. IMS Health is supplying pharmaceutical companies with sales 
                                                
71 See Jones & Sufrin, supra n 42, pp 558 ff. 
72 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA 
relevance), OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25 (“Regulation 1/2003”). See also Jones & Sufrin, 
supra n 42, p 287. 
73 See Compare Judgment in EMI v CBS, Case 51/75, ECR 1976-811; Judgment in RTE 
and ITP v Commission, Joined cases C-241, 242/91 P, ECR I-808, para 46 (“Magill”) with 
Judgment in Parke, Davis and Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm, 
Case 24/67 1968 55; Hilti v Commission, supra n 67, para 93. See also Guidance paper, 
supra n 36, [17]. 
74 See Jonathan D.C. Turner,  Intellectual property and EU competition law (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p 85 . 
75 See Ibid p 86. 
76 See Guy Tritton,  Tritton on intellectual property in Europe (Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p 
1605 . 
77 See IMS Health NDC Health, supra n 20. 
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data in a “brick” structure where each brick correspond to a designated 
geographical area.78 In 2000, after discovering some competitors’ usage of 
the structure, IMS Health obtained an injunction from a German court.79  
 
NDC Health filed a complaint to the European Commission claiming abuse 
of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. The Commission ordered IMS 
Health to grant a license, but the President of the Court of First Instance 
later suspended the decision.80 IMS Health brought actions against NDC 
Health for usage of the structure, and the German court decided to stay the 
proceedings and refer questions to the CJEU. 
 
It is an abusive behaviour, explicitly exemplified in Article 102 (b) TFEU, 
to create a market barrier for new products or to limit technical 
development. The notion of “new product” is a balance of the value of 
protection for intellectual property rights and the interest of free competition 
and right to conduct business.81 As held in IMS Health v NDC Health 
judgment, free competition prevails if the “refusal to grant a license 
prevents the development of the secondary market to the detriment of 
consumers.”82 Notably, the undertaking aspiring to enter the market cannot 
“duplicate the goods or services already offered on the secondary market”, 
but must produce new products for which there is potential consumer 
demand.83  
 
The fact that an undertaking is protecting its intellectual property right by 
preventing unlicensed users to make use of its products does not constitute 
an abuse under Article 102 TFEU. However, to frustrate or delay a licensing 
of the right might be an abuse;84 to register a trademark used by its 
competitors in other Member States might constitute an abuse.85 
Furthermore, to give misleading representation numerous times in order to 
acquire an extended patent protection and preserve supplementary 
protection in respect of medicines are abusive conduct.86  
 
                                                
78 See Ibid, para 4.  
79 See Case COMP D3/38.044 – NDC Health v IMS Health: Interim measures, OJ 2002 L 
59, p.18, art. 1. 
80 See Judgment in IMS Health v Commission, T-184/01 R, ECR II-3193. 
81 See Article 16 and 17 of the CFREU. 
82 See IMS Health v NDC Health, supra n 20, para 48. 
83 See Ibid para 49. 
84 See Hilti v Commission, supra n 67. 
85 See Osram/Airam, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy (1981), [97]. 
86 See Judgment in AstraZeneca, COMP/A 37.507/F3 (“AstraZeneca – Commission 
decision”), para 626. See also Judgment AstraZeneca v Commission, T-321/05, ECR II-
2805 (“AstraZeneca – General Court”); AstraZeneca, supra n 21. 
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2.2.4 AstraZeneca v Commission 
2.2.4.1 Background  
The Commission imposed a fine of EUR 60 million on AstraZeneca plc and 
AstraZeneca AB (“AstraZeneca”) for abuse of dominant position.87 The 
decision was appealed to the General Court, and was finally settled by 
judgment of the CJEU.88  
 
The decision stems from AstraZeneca’s attempt to expand its monopoly on 
the EU market for the market of Losec by misuse of patent regulations. 
Losec is a brand name and most commonly used on the European market for 
the omeprazole-based pharmaceutical product used in treatments of 
gastrointestinal conditions liked with hyperacidity and proactively inhibit 
acid secretion into the stomach. The product was the first product on the 
market to act directly on the proton pump, i.e. the enzyme in the parietal 
cells along the stomach walls. Accordingly, Losec decreases the acid 
production when patients medicate with it.89 
 
AstraZeneca was claimed to have misled multiple national patent offices 
and national courts in order to obtain a supplementary protection certificate 
(“SPC”), to prolong the protection of the patent for Losec. Furthermore, 
AstraZeneca had withdrawn the market authorisation for Losec by 
deregistration, arguably to make market entry harder for generic companies.   
 
2.2.4.2 Commission Decision and General Court 
In 1999, the generic undertakings Generics (UK) Ltd and Scandinavian 
Pharmaceuticals Generics AB complained to the Commission and claimed 
that AstraZeneca’s actions prevented generic products of omeprazole to 
enter the market.90 The Commission found that AstraZeneca had committed 
two abuses, and consequently breached Article 82 EC [now 102 TFEU].  
 
The first abuse consisted of misleading representations to national patent 
offices and the Member States of the European Economic Area’s courts. 
AstraZeneca tried to induce the national patent offices of Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway, and 
national courts in Norway and Germany, to deliver a supplementary 
protection certificate to which it was not entitled.91  
 
The second abuse consisted of AstraZeneca’s deregistration of the market 
authorisation in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Such a withdrawal was 
conducted in order to make the launch of generic products on the market 
more difficult or at least delay it, and prevent parallel import of Losec to this 
                                                
87 See AstraZeneca – Commission decision, supra n 86, p 198. 
88 See AstraZeneca, supra n 21. 
89 See AstraZeneca – Commission decision, supra n 86, pp 5 ff. 
90 See Ibid pp 5 ff. 
91 See Ibid, pp 32 ff. 
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area.92 The Commission decided to fine AstraZeneca for abusive behaviour 
on the market to a sum of EUR 60 million.93  
 
The General Court upheld the Commission decision in its entirety. 
However, the General Court found the Commission to error in evaluating 
the second abuse of dominance, namely, in the assessment of the parallel 
import of Losec. The General Court held that the Commission had failed to 
establish that the withdrawal was capable of restricting the parallel import 
and argued that the conduct was not objectively of a nature to exclude the 
imports and competition.94 The fine was reduced to EUR 52,5 million.95  
 
2.2.4.3 Court of Justice of the European Union 
Considering the first abuse, the CJEU upheld the judgment in its entirety but 
seized the opportunity to clarify the test utilised when assessing misleading 
statement to a patent office.  
 
The CJEU underlined that representation in itself cannot constitute an abuse, 
regardless of its anti-competitive effects on the market. Representation can 
only lead to an abusive conduct if it is designed to unlawfully obtain an 
exclusive right and that “those representations are actually liable to lead the 
public authorities to grant the exclusive right applied for.”96 Subsequently, 
the CJEU deemed the representation as a fact of the case, but not the central 
issue at hand. The central issue for the CJEU was the intent to mislead and 
intent to conduct an abusive behaviour.  
 
Regarding the second abuse, AstraZeneca argued that the withdrawal of the 
market authorisation of Losec was merely an exercise of their right 
conferred upon them by EU law. An exercise of a right could not be 
prohibited, in AstraZeneca’s view, at the same time as legally granted. The 
CJEU countered with the fact that, firstly, there was no objective 
justification for AstraZeneca to withdraw those registrations.97 Secondly, 
the withdrawal could not legitimately protect an investment in such a way 
that it came within the scope of competition on the merits.98 Thirdly, the 
CJEU clearly stated that the illegality of an abusive conduct by a dominant 
undertaking could not be justified by the lawfulness of the behaviour under 
other areas of law.99 The CJEU established that a dominant undertaking has 
a special responsibility, which implies that:100 
                                                
92 See Ibid p 61. 
93 See Ibid p 198. 
94 See AstraZeneca – General Court, supra n 87, para 901; 905.  
95 See Ibid para 931. 
96 See AstraZeneca, supra n 21, [106]. 
97 See Ibid [130]. 
98 See Ibid [131]. 
99 See Ibid [132]. The paragraph provides: “the illegality of abusive conduct under 
Article [102 TFEU] is unrelated to its compliance or non-compliance with other legal rules 
and, in the majority of cases, abuses of dominant positions consist of behaviour which is 
otherwise lawful under branches of law other than competition law.” 
100 See Ibid. 
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it cannot therefore use regulatory procedures in such a way as to prevent or 
make more difficult the entry of competitors on the market, in the absence of 
grounds relating to the defence of the legitimate interests of an undertaking 
engaged in competition on the merits or in the absence of objective 
justification. 
 
The CJEU furthermore refused the argument that the exercise of a right 
lawfully afforded by EU law could not amount to an abuse, or only amount 
to an abuse in exceptional cases, and held that101 
 
The fact that the exercise of such options by an undertaking in a dominant 
position is limited or made subject to conditions in order to ensure that 
competition already weakened by the presence of that undertaking is not 
subsequently undermined is in no way an exceptional case and does not 
justify a derogation from Article 82 EC, unlike a situation in which the 
unfettered exercise of an exclusive right awarded for the realisation of an 
investment or creation is limited. 
 
The CJEU shows by its adjudication an eagerness to widen the scope of the 
concept of abuse, and making the test of objective justifications more strict. 
Furthermore, the other essential aspect  of the judgment is the Court’s 
statement that nothing apart  from competition on the merits is allowed, and 
anything else should be considered an abuse of dominance. 
 
  
                                                
101 See Ibid [150]. Compare to Ibid [142]. 
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2.3 EU public procurement law 
All governmental authorities around Europe have to purchase 
pharmaceuticals through public procurement procedures. If a public 
insurance schemes is in place that funds the healthcare entities directly or 
indirectly, those entities must utilise tender procedures as governed by EU 
law for supply of medicaments. Even sickness insurance funds and 
healthcare entities are included if receiving funds from the government in 
any way.102 This chapter will quickly run through the basic aspects of EU 
procurement law in order to give a better understanding of the procedure 
and the remedies available for an aggrieved party.  
Three directives govern EU public procurement law.103 The directives 
consist of substantial changes in comparison to the previous ones that they 
repealed, and an implementation on the Europe 2020 goals and influenced 
by the Mario Monti Report A New Strategy for the Single Market104.105 The 
directives are still under implementation in the Member States.106 The 
directives, both previous and current, lay the foundation for the public 
procurement law in the Member States.107  
 
The directives prescribe which procurement procedures that are approved of 
under different circumstances, and how selection and award criteria can be 
formulated.108 For example, the selection and award criteria must be precise 
and advertised, and tender offer shall be disregarded if it does not fulfil the 
advertised criteria.109 The public procurement directives are governed by 
three fundamental principles of EU law, namely, equal treatment, 
proportionality and transparency. These principles are the pillars that public 
                                                
102 See Marc Martens & Nicolas Carbonelle, White paper: Public procurement of medicinal 
products - Common legislation but diverging implementation approaches throughout the 
EU, p 4. 
103 See Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 
28.3.2014, p. 65–242 (”Classic directive”); Directive 2014/25/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in 
the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 243–374 (”Utilities directive”); and Directive 
2014/23/EU of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 
28.3.2014, p. 1–64 (“Concession directive”). 
104 Mario Monti, "A New Strategy for the Single Market", Report to the President of the 
European Commission, 9 May 2010. 
105 See e.g. Ibid pp 6 ff. 
106 E.g. the legislative act implementing the new rules on public procurement will be 
brought to voting by the Swedish Parliament in the spring 2016, see SOU 2014:25 “Nya 
regler om upphandling”. See also, for more general comments, Christoffer Bovis, EU 
Public Procurement Law (Elgar European Law, 2nd ed, 2012), pp 6 ff. 
107 See Martens & Carbonelle, supra n 103. 
108 See e.g. Classic directive, supra n 103, Article 58 & 67; Utilities directive, supra 102, 
Article 80 & 82.  
109 See e.g. Classic directive, supra n 103, Article 56; Article 67 (4-5); Whereas 89. See also 
Bovis, supra n 106, p 219 ff. 
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procurement rests upon, and visible both through the wording of provisions 
and explicitly mentioned in the preambles.110 
 
However, the Remedy directive111 ensures compliance with the procurement 
rules and affords the aggrieved party effective means for redemption due to 
a fault conducted in the tender procedure.112 Remedies can be both pre- and 
post-contractual. The pre-contractual remedies offer a possibility for a 
national court to set aside the award of the contract, if the procedure is 
found unlawful.113 Alongside the nullification of contract, the aggrieved 
party can claim damages because of harm suffered due to the loss of 
contract.114 Two options are ultimately at hand if the award of the contract is 
set aside, either the contract is awarded to the runner-up in the tender or to 
redo the tender procedure following procedural regulations. Post-contractual 
remedies consist of a right to damages and that the award of contract will be 
deemed ineffective. 
 
The directives are the ground rules for procurement procedures. The new 
directives are currently being implemented in Member States’ legislations. 
The Remedies directive is already, and will remain, implemented in Member 
States’ legislation and will continue to be applicable to all procurement 
procedures covered by the applicability of the procurement directives. 
Tender procedures on pharmaceuticals are governed by these rules, and 
offers the remedies to turn to when a party has been faultily aggrieved. 
                                                
110 See Ibid Article 76 & Whereas 1.  
111 Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving 
the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, OJ L 335, 
20.12.2007, p. 31–46 (“Remedies directive”). 
112 See Remedies directive, Article 1. 
113 See Ibid Article 2 & 2d. 
114 See Ibid Article 2. 
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3 Patent law 
3.1 Introduction 
Patent law has roots stretching back to the informal system of the 
Renaissance’s Italy. The Italian glass blowers spread the use of patents to 
the rest of Europe to protect their skills.115 The international conventions on 
patents are extensively developed.116 The importance to protect inventions 
increased in the wake of the industrialisation. Effective protection of the 
inventions was hindered by the diversified and ineffective legal systems. 
The first international convention on patent was the Paris Convention, 
which was signed 1883 after ten years of conferences and drafts.117 The 
Paris Convention has influenced the international system of patent law, and 
most patent law systems around the globe stem from the convention.118  
 
The EPO supervises the EPC, and is not a EU institution but consists of an 
additional eleven non-EU members.119 The CJEU has held that international 
conventions and treaties to which it is a signatory cannot create rights for 
individuals to rely upon before the Court. However, it was held in Monsanto 
v Cefetra120 that EU law was to be interpreted to the furthest extent possible 
in the accordance with the TRIPS.121 Case law by the EPO has also been 
taken into account in judgments by the CJEU.122 Subsequently, the EU does 
not remain unaffected by the international patent systems and Europe 2020 
states that it is of importance for the EU to safeguard invention, in order to 
compete globally and stimulate investors in European companies.123 
Furthermore, the pharmaceutical sector is one of the major industries in the 
EU and its competitiveness is important for the economic development.124  
 
A patent is valid for 20 years. After the expiry, any company who sees fit 
can enter the market.125 This chapter will study pharmaceutical patents with 
focus on second medical use patents and skinny labelling. The first 
subchapter will focus on EU and the development of the unitary patent law 
system, whilst the following subchapters will study pharmaceutical patents 
and, lastly, scrutinise the pregabalin judgments.  
                                                
115 See Thomson & Reuters, “The History of Pantent”. 
116 See Marianne Levin, Lärobok i immaterialrätt (Norstedts Juridik, 10th ed, 2011), pp 29 
ff; Tritton, supra n 76, pp 68 ff. 
117 See Paris Convention, supra n 1.  
118 See e.g. TRIPs, supra n 4; the Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 
7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231 reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 978 (1970); and the EPC, supra n 3. 
119 See Tritton, supra n 76, pp 90f; pp 123ff. 
120 See Judgment in Monsanto v Cefetra, C-428/08, ECR I-6765. 
121 See Ibid para 72. 
122 See e.g. Judgment in Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, C-414/11, e.r.. 
123 See EUROPE 2020, supra n 10, pp 3f. 
124 See European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, The 
Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures – Key data 2013, p 3. 
125 See TRIPs, supra n 4, Article 33. 
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3.2 The European Union and Patent Law 
3.2.1 The Unitary Patent System 
The EU law on patents is in the starting pits. There were only two legislative 
measures in force on patents up until 2012.126 There has been an on-going 
process to harmonise the national legislations on patents since 1965, when 
presenting the first draft on a harmonised patent law.127 The striving for a 
unitary patent regulation had years of political deadlocks and 
disagreements.128  
 
The TEU, the TFEU and the CFREU introduced multiple provisions 
safeguarding and strengthening the stand of patent law and intellectual 
property in general in the EU. Not only does the Article 36 TFEU exempt 
the intangible rights from the prohibition of quantitative restrictions, but it is 
also stipulated in Article 118(1) TFEU that:  
 
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the 
European Parliament and the Council, (…), shall establish measures for the 
creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union and for the 
setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, coordination and 
supervision arrangements.  
  
Two regulations, adopted on a unitary patent in December 2012, sprung 
from the initiative of a group of Member States. The group utilised the 
enhanced cooperation procedure as provided in Article 20 of the TFEU. 129 
The two regulations, Unitary Patent Regulation130 and the Council 
Regulation Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation 
of Unitary Patent Protection with Regard to the Applicable Translation 
Arrangements131, was drafted as a package together with a third instrument, 
the UPC Agreement.132 Whilst the two regulations are legislative acts of the 
EU and, therefore, enjoy the privilege as a source of EU law, the UPC 
Agreement is an international agreement and separated from EU law as 
such. This renders the UPC Agreement only applicable if ratified, and only 
                                                
126 Namely, the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, Official Journal L 213 , 
30/07/1998 p.13 – 21, and, Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 
concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, 
OJ L 182, 2.7.1992, p. 1–5. 
127 See Tritton, supra n 76, pp 278 ff. 
128 See Ibid. 
129 See Alfredo Ilardi, The New European Patent (Hart Publishing Ldt, 2015), p 29. 
130 Unitary Patent Regulation, supra n 24. 
131 Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the 
applicable translation arrangements, OJ L 361, 31.12.2012, p. 89–92 (“Reg 1260/2012”). 
132 See UPC Agreement, supra n 25. 
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to the Member States who ratifies it.133 However, the regulations are co-
dependent on the ratification of the UPC Agreement in order to enter into 
effect.134  The unitary patent regime lies in the future, awaiting a number of 
ratifications of the UPC Agreement, before it will come into effect.135  
 
The current system of EU patent law consists of parallel systems. An 
inventor can file for protection in a single Member State, making use of the 
national system and enjoy protection in that specific territory. The other 
option is to apply for an EPO patent, which will provide protection in 
selected states simultaneously. Nevertheless, the acquired protection will 
still be regarded as a bundle of national patents for each of the designated 
states.136 The system is Europe wide and offers protection in selected 
European countries, including some non-EU Member States.137 However, 
the risk of such a system is diversified precedence in the Member States, 
which leads to a legal uncertainty for all parties involved in disputes since a 
patent rarely is nation specific but enjoys protection in multiple countries.138 
For example, a patent deemed infringing a generic pharmaceutical in 
Germany might not be considered to infringe the same patent in Sweden. 
Such inconsistency renders high costs for litigation and a legal uncertainty 
hampering development.  
 
The main reason to enforce the Unitary Patent System is the need for an 
effective adjudication and application on enforcement and infringements in 
the EU. The new system aims at enhancing legal efficiency and keeping 
costs low. Currently, undertakings have to litigate in all Member States 
where the disputed patent is registered in order for it to be enforced or 
revoked.139 A Unitary Patent Court would assure Member States 
adjudication in one forum only for the patent claims with coherent 
interpretation of the regulations.140 Furthermore, the UPC Agreement and 
the procedural rules for the court stipulates that questions shall be referred 
to the CJEU upon request, and such referrals shall follow the rules 
established for the CJEU.141 
 
                                                
133 See Ibid Article 2. 
134 See Unitary Patent Regulation, supra n 24, Article 18.2; Reg 1260/2012, supra n 131, 
Article 7.2. 
135 For current status of ratification see link: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-
conventions/agreement/?aid=2013001. 
136 See Tritton, supra n 76, p 240.  
137 See Ibid pp 90 f. 
138 See Ibid p 240; Levin, supra n 116, pp 274 f. 
139 See Judgment in Roche Nederland and Others, C-539/03, ECR I-6535, and compare to 
Judgment in GAT mot LuK, C-4/03, ECR-6509. See also Levin, supra n 116, p 274. 
140 See Ilardi, supra n 128, pp 66 f. 
141 See UPC Agreement; supra n 25, Article 21 & 38; Rule of Proceedings of the Unified 
Patent Court (18th draft of 19 October 2015), Rule 266. 
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3.2.2 Pharmaceutical patents 
3.2.2.1 The pharmaceutical sector’s use of patents 
The intensity of patenting inventions is higher in the pharmaceutical sector 
compared to other areas of business.142 The pharmaceutical sector includes 
businesses that are producing and selling chemical and biological medicinal 
products on the market. The sector consists of few very large companies and 
multiple small ones. However, middle-sized pharmaceutical companies are 
rare on the market.143 Applications for patent protection are normally filed at 
an early stage of the research of the pharmaceutical products. The protection 
is essential for the pharmaceutical companies to be sure to have the 
exclusive right to the pharmaceutical and recapitalise their investments.144  
 
Pharmaceutical products constitute in most cases individual markets, even  
if the pharmaceutical sector as such is a heterogenic sector, which is due to 
the lack of substitution between the products. The lack of substitutes might 
stem from either that the medicinal products treat different deceases or that 
the side effects caused by the medicinal products are different whilst 
treating the same decease.145  
 
Generic pharmaceutical products are medicaments consisting of an already 
known biological API.146 An indication is the symptom that the substance 
aims at treating. The indications can aim to treat a disease, specific 
symptoms or have mere preventive effects.147 They are the counteroffer to 
the previously patent-protected pharmaceutical. The product to which the 
patent has expired is the reference medicinal product referred to by a generic 
when applying for market authorisation.148 Generic pharmaceuticals are 
low-priced and normally tough competition for the original product to adjust 
to. The general thought, based on economic theory, is that the original 
product will decrease in price in order to adjust to the new competitor at the 
market. However, there are situations when both parties have benefitted 
from the market entry of a generic product. Consumer preferences are 
governing the market, and there have been cases when an original product 
has been able to increase its price after the entry of a generic producer. The 
consumers that value the original brand chose to pay a higher piece whilst 
the price-oriented consumers choses the generic pharmaceutical.149 
 
The area of pharmaceutical patent is a unique field of patent law in many 
ways. The “for use” indications are generally known not to limit the patent 
to an actual specific use, but rather to indicate what products that might fit 
                                                
142 See Marianne Levin & Hanna Nilsson, Läkemedel & Immaterialrätt (Jure, 2008), pp 12 
f. 
143 See Bengt Domeij, Läkemedelspatent (Norstedts Juridik, 1998), p 4. 
144 See Ibid  pp 1 f. 
145 See Ibid pp 8 f. 
146 See Ibid p 8. 
147 See Ibid p 313. 
148 See below Chapter 3.2.2.2. 
149 See Domeij, supra n 140, pp 8 f. 
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the purpose. Subsequently, the novelty of a product does not rest in its use 
and a patent cannot be granted for an addition to the usage or purpose, but 
for pharmaceutical patents it is rather the opposite.150 Pharmaceutical 
substances and compositions are exempted from the general rule of Article 
54(4) and (5) EPC and second medical use patents are common. Such an 
exemption only extends to substances and compositions, and no analogies 
have been accepted by the EPO.151 
 
3.2.2.2 Pharmaceutical products’ market authorisation 
A pharmaceutical product must be assessed and approved before entering 
the EU market.152 A market authorisation is granted either by the competent 
national authority or by the European Medicines Agency (“EMA”) 
according to Article 6 of Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code 
relating to medicinal products for human use153 (“Medicinal product 
directive”).154 Such limitation sets the frame within which the product is 
authorised to be utilised in and the conditions imposed on the product. The 
purpose of such a system is to guarantee the safety, efficiency and quality of 
the product.155 
 
There are four different types of procedures to grant authorisation: the 
centralised procedure, the mutual recognition procedure (“MRP”), and the 
decentralized procedure and the national procedure.156 Regulation (EC) No 
726/2004 regulates the centralised procedure. The procedure is compulsory 
for pharmaceutical products containing a new API intended for AIDS, 
cancer, neurodegenerative disorder or diabetes.157 
 
The MRP is the recognition of the pre-existing authorisation by one or more 
Members States of the pharmaceutical product.158 The decentralised 
procedure is executed by application for authorisation in several Member 
States. One of the Member States is chosen as “Reference Member State” 
and the market authorisation is after a review granted in both the reference 
                                                
150 See Rainer Moufang, “Patentability of pharmaceutical inventions: the European 
perspective” in Josef Drexl & Nari Lee, Pharmaceutical Invention, Competition and Patent 
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), p 65.  
151 T 227/91 of 15 December 1992, OJ EPO 1994, 491 – Second surgical use/CODMAN. 
152 See Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision 
of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, p. 1–33 (“Regulation 
(EC) No 726/2004”), Tile IV.  
153 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 
2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67–128 (”Medicinal product directive ”). 
154 See Ibid Article 6. 
155 See Sally Shorthose, Guide to EU Pharmaceutical Regulatory Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
5th ed, 2014), p 119. 
156 See Ibid pp 122 f.  
157 See Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, supra n 152, Whereas 8 & Annex. 
158 See Shorthose, supra n 155, pp 122 f. 
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state and the other Member States.159 The national procedure is carried out 
on a Member State level and is rather rarely used.160 The procedures are 
applicable to most conventional pharmaceutical products.161 
 
The application must fulfil certain requirements in order to be granted the 
authorisation. The Medicinal product directive sets the general requirements 
utilised both by the EMA and the national authorities when assessing 
applications. Article 8(3) Medicinal product directive requires that amongst 
others the following are submitted:162 
 
• Description of the manufacturing method, 
• Therapeutic indications, 
• “A written confirmation that the manufacturer of the medicinal 
product has verified compliance of the manufacturer of the API with 
principles and guidelines of good manufacturing practice”, 
• Results of pharmaceutical, pre-clinical and clinical tests, and 
• Summary of the product characteristics, the packaging including 
leaflet 
 
The EMA and its Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use is the 
granting and supervising authority of pharmaceutical products in the EU.163 
The Committee forms an opinion on the application that the EMA sends to 
the Commission. The file sent to the Commission contains the opinion and 
an assessment report. The report includes the details of the submitted 
application. The decision is valid in all Member States and results in that the 
products “may be marketed in all Member States.”164  
 
As mentioned above, an applicant can chose to apply to the EMA or the 
national authority. The most commonly used system for larger 
pharmaceutical companies is to apply to the EMA whilst smaller companies 
apply to the national authorities.165 A market authorisation holder may 
withdraw the market authorisation to the pharmaceutical product by 
submission of written observations to the national competent authority.166 
 
Market authorisation is granted for a generic pharmaceutical product by 
application to the authorities. The generic pharmaceutical product must meet 
the same quality requirements as the reference medicinal product, i.e. the 
prior patent protected product with which the generic product will compete. 
Furthermore, the generic product must be bioequivalent to the reference 
medicinal product. Bioequivalence is a comparison of the reference 
medicinal product and the generic product, assessing to what extent the API 
                                                
159 See Ibid p 123. 
160 See Ibid. 
161 See Levin, supra n 142, p 130. 
162 See Medicinal product directive, supra n 153, Article 8(3)(a-m). 
163 See Ibid Article 5 & 10; 55 & 57(1)(k). 
164 European Commission, The Centralised Procedure. 
165 See Shorthose, supra n 155, p 123. 
166 See Medicinal product directive, supra n 153, Article 22 a. 
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reaches its full effect. However, the generic product is allowed to differ 
from the reference medicinal product to some extent, for example in form, 
colour or size.167  
 
3.2.2.3 First and Second Medical Use Patents 
A pharmaceutical substance’s description in a patent claim must be 
specified in order to be approved for registration. Such specification stems 
from the fact that the pharmaceutical product, and substance, must fulfil the 
requirement of industrial application.168 An already patented substance can 
enjoy a second patent protection if it is the first time the substance is 
patented as a pharmaceutical substance. Such patent is called a first medical 
use patent.169 
 
First medical use patents enjoy broad protection as held in EPO’s early 
decision Pyrrolidine Derivatives/HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE.170 The patent 
claims were disputed as they, allegedly, had been broadly defined. 
Hoffmann-La Roche had filed for a protection “for the use as an active 
therapeutic substance”.171 The Boards of Appeal made an analogy to 
chemical compounds and the principle of equal treatment that could not be 
interpreted from the wording of the EPC. It found that inventions, which 
were previously known but still patentable as a first medical use patent, 
were to be treated differently from other inventions. Based on the principle 
of equal treatment, the Boards of Appeals held that if a chemical compound 
could be granted absolute protection for use in therapy, so should the 
“inventor who for the first time makes a known compound available for 
therapy.”172 The Boards of Appeals found that the fact that Article 54(4) 
EPC does not provide the protection as broad as now stated, did not limit 
the scope. It was held that the usual practice relating to new compounds had 
to be followed even if it was a first medical use claim.173 
  
First medical use patents focus on the use of the pharmaceutical. However, 
there are situations where a first medical use patent is discovered to treat 
other diseases than the ones indicated in the patent. Such discovery is not 
covered by the first medical use patent. However, it is possible to protect the 
new discovered area of treatment by the use of a second medical use 
patent.174 A second medical use patent is a patent protecting the use of the 
                                                
167 See Levin, supra n 142, p 124.  
168 See Annette Kur & Thomas Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law: Test, Cases & 
Materials (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), p 110. 
169 See SOU 2006:70 Oinskränkt produktskydd för patent på genteknikområdet, p 139.   
170 See Decision of 12 January 1984, OJ EPO 1984, 164 – Pyrrolidine-
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indication for a specific type of use. The novelty of the patent lies in the 
new use of the patent.175  
 
The scope of protection for a second medical use patent is limited to the 
registered patent claims. Consequently, the patent claims must be specified 
and narrow in order for a second medical use patent not to infringe the first 
medical use patent, or other second medical use patents for that matter. The 
limitation in scope is “intended to match as closely as possible the scope of 
protection to the scope provided by a Swiss type claim.”176 This stems from 
the wording of Article 54(5) EPC. Article 54(5) EPC is expressly limited to 
the specific use in the patent claim, and seems to not leave room for 
expansion.177 
 
Accordingly, second medical use “defines the use in a specific manner”.178 
The Enlarged Board of Appeal accepted such type of claims early on, but is 
not accepting them any longer due to the amendment of the EPC.179 The 
second medical use patent can be utilised on the same disease as the first 
medical use patent if done so with some modifications, as held by the 
Boards of Appeals in case law:180 
 
Article 54(5) EPC does not exclude a medicament that is already used in the 
treatment of an illness being patented for use in a different treatment by 
therapy of the same illness. 
 
Such patenting is also not excluded when a dosage regime is the only feature 
claimed that is not comprised in the state of the art. 
 
In summary, first and second medical use patents have different scope of 
protection. There is no limitation as to how many second medical use 
patents that can be granted on the same substance. The wording of the patent 
claim is essential to the scope of protection. Nonetheless, the protection 
cannot be extended outside the specific use of the pharmaceutical patent in 
question.181  
 
                                                
175 See G 5/83, OJ EPO 1985 64, EISAI/Second medical indication (“G 5/83 EISAI”), p 22. 
176 See EPO, Case law of the Boards of Appeals – 6.2.1 Introduction. 
177 Article 54 EPC is worded:  
(5) Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall also not exclude the patentability of any substance or 
composition referred to in paragraph 4 for any specific use in a method referred to in 
Article 53(c), provided that such use is not comprised in the state of the art. 
178 See T 1599/06 (Mycobacterium vaccinating agent/UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA) of 
13.9.2007, p. 19. 
179 See G 1/83, G 5/83, G 6/83 of 5 December 1984 , OJ EPO 1985, 60, 64, 67, 
– Second medical indication/BAYER/EISAI/PHARMUKA. See also G-2/08 Dosage 
Regime, supra n 173. 
180 See G-2/08 Dosage Regime, supra n 173, p 2. 
181 See Domeij, Pharmaceutical patents in Europe, (Kluwer Law International/Norstedts 
Juridik, 2000), p 183. 
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3.2.2.4 Swiss type claims and EPC 2000 claims 
Second medical use claims were up until the adoption of the EPC 2000 
designed as Swiss type claims.182 EPC 1973 did not approve of patent 
claims formed to protect an already known substance. The Swiss type claim 
was created to make it possible for pharmaceutical undertakings to protect 
the discovery that already known therapeutic substances could be used in 
the treatment of another disease. The Boards of Appeal held in G 5/83 
EISAI/Second medical indication that the Swiss type claim had to be 
allowed in order to overcome the obligations stipulated in Article 54(5) EPC 
1973 and to ascertain legal certainty. Furthermore, the Board held that the 
German form claims were not to be approved since they aimed at the 
method of medical treatment.183 
 
The structure of the Swiss type claim consists of pharmaceutical ingredient 
followed by a statement of purpose (“Use of a substance or composition X 
for the manufacture of a medicament for therapeutic application Z”).184  
 
The Enlarged Board of Appeal declared the invalidity of Swiss type claims 
in 2010. The Board held in Decision G 2/08 that Swiss type claims where to 
be disregarded and invalidated as a second medical use claim. However, due 
to legal certaintly, the pending applications before the EPO and applications 
submitted three months after the judgment’s publication would not be 
affected by the new jurisprudence established by it.185 Consequently, the 
application must have filing or priority date prior to 29 January 2011 in 
order to be approved containing a Swiss type claim.186 
 
The rules of the EPO were amended by the EPC 2000. Some tend to say 
that the amendments lessened the complexity of the second medical use 
claims. The new convention approves of claims stated as “substance X for 
the treatment of Y”, if X is a known substance, and "Substance X for use in 
the treatment of disease Y", if the claim involves an inventive step. EPO 
holds that the Swiss type claim is relating to the method of treatment, which 
is explicitly excluded from patentability under Article 53(c) EPC.187 This 
type of claim only remedies the manufacturer or dealer, but cannot target the 
true infringer. Furthermore, its scope of protection only expands to the 
actual indication in the claim.188 
 
                                                
182 See EPC 1973; G 5/83 EISAI, supra n 175, [20 – 21] of the Reasons. 
183 See G 5/83 EISAI, supra n 175. See also Triton, supra n 76, p 152. 
184 See IP Kat, ”No pain for Actavis – Warner-Lambert fail to stop launch of generic 
Pregabalin” 21 January 2015.  
185 See G 2/08 Dosage regime, supra n 173, [7.1.4]. 
186 See EPO, Notice from the European Patent Office dated 20 September 2010 concerning 
the non-acceptance of Swiss-type claims for second or further medical use following 
decision G 2/08 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal, OJ EPO 2010, 514. 
187 See EPO, Guidelines for examination - Second or further medical use of known 
pharmaceutical products, G-IV-7.1. 
188 Triton, supra n 76, p 152; Domeij, supra n 143, p 325. 
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The difference between the claims is that the Swiss type claim grants a 
purpose-related process protection, whilst the EPC 2000 claim grants a 
purpose-related product protection.189  It is not settled what the direct 
difference is. The relation between Swiss type claims and EPC 2000 claims 
remains highly disputed by scholars and practitioners. The definite scope of 
protection for the new type of claims remains uncertain since the issue still 
has not been settled. Not even the Boards of Appeals has been able to settle 
the issue. The Board held in T 1780/12 that the claims are kind of the same 
but different. It stated that a process protection confers less protection than a 
purpose-related product protection does, but that the new protection is equal 
to the old as provided by the Swiss type claims.190 The Board recited the 
travaux préparatoires and stated that:191 
In contrast to previous Article 54(5), now Article 54(4) EPC, providing broad 
(generic) protection for use in a medical method for the inventor of such use 
for the first time, new Article 54(5) is expressly limited to a specific use. This 
limitation is intended to match as closely as possible the scope of protection 
to the scope provided by a 'Swiss type claim'.  
The following study will refer to this definition of the scope of protection as 
provided by the EPC 2000, i.e. almost but not identical.  
 
3.2.2.5 The Concept of Skinny Labelling 
The pharmaceutical sector has been evolving and growing over the last 
decades. At the same time, there have been a significant increase of second 
medical use patents and the authorisation of generic products on the 
market.192 A drastic intensification of competition has occurred by the 
generic products’ entry.193  
 
According to the Medicinal product directive, and as clarified above, a 
pharmaceutical product must be granted market authorisation in order to 
enter the market. A generic product must declare all necessary product 
information, e.g. a leaflet and list of contents.194 However, a manufacturer 
can withhold certain indications from the product summary of the generic 
product, if such indications are patent protected.195 Consequently, skinny 
labelling is, simplified, to withhold information on, e.g. the leaflet or 
packaging that would, that if specified would infringe a valid patent. 
Accordingly, information is deleted from the description in order to protect 
the valid second medical use patent and to produce a product able to 
                                                
189 See G 2/08 Dosage regime, supra n 173. 
190 T 1780/12 (Cancer treatment/BOARD OF REGENTS, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
SYSTEM), OJ EPO 2014, 130 (”T 1780/12 Cancer treatment”), pp 22 f; Compare to EPO, 
Basic Proposal - Explanatory notes - Article 54(4) and Article 54(5) EPC, 21 November 
2000, MR/18/00, p 4. 
191 See T 1780/12 Cancer treatment, supra n 188, p 23. 
192 See Domeij, supra n 143. 
193 See Domeij, supra n 140, pp 9 f. 
194 See e.g. Medicinal product directive, supra n 153, Article 10 & 11. 
195 See Ibid Article 11(2). 
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compete with the reference medicinal product.196 However, due to 
substitution based on API by pharmacies in some Member States, the 
generic medicinal product might end up as a substitute to the patent 
protected pharmaceutical since the API remains named in the information to 
the skinny label generic product.197 
 
EU law approves of generic medical product to enter the market, after the 
authorisation of a competent authority in a Member States.198 Furthermore, 
Article 3(3) of the Regulation 726/2004 states that:199 
 
b) the summary of the product characteristics is in all relevant respects 
consistent with that of the medicinal product authorised by the Community 
except for those parts of the summary of product characteristics referring to 
indications or dosage forms which were still covered by patent law at the 
time when the generic medicine was marketed  
 
The paragraph approves of the generic undertakings using skinny labelling 
in order to enter the market. Skinny labelling is essential for a generic 
pharmaceutical company, which otherwise would commit patent 
infringements of the valid second medical use patents. For example, a 
generic product of pregabalin can be dispensed for the treatment of epilepsy 
and generalised anxiety disorder (“GAD”) since the protection has expired 
for these indications, but not for neuropathic pain for which the patent 
remains in force.200 Consequently, skinny labelling guarantees that effective 
competition can prosper at the market of the reference medicinal product, 
whilst invention can make progress for other indications.  
 
Conclusively, skinny labelling is an exemption to some of the basic 
principles of patent law, especially the principle of equivalence. The 
principle of equivalence is the core in establishing an infringement. The 
basic proposition is that if the two medicinal products are equal, 
infringement has occurred.201 Article 3(3) Regulation 726/2004 stipulates a 
direct exemption to the general principle. This exemption is the basis for the 
use of skinny labelling and the safeguard for a potential market exposed to 
competition.   
 
                                                
196 See Ibid.  
197 See e.g. District Court Hamburg, decisions of 2 April 2015, docket numbers 327 O 
67/15, 327 O 132/15, 327 O 140/15, 327 O 143/15 – Pregabalin (“District court 
Hamburg”). 
198 See Levin & Hansson, supra n 142, p 131. 
199 See Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, Article 3 (3). 
200 See ”What is the intention with skinny labels and second medical use patents?” by 
Christopher Hayes in Journal of Generic Medicines (2015) 11(3-4), pp166 ff. 
201 See Levin, supra n 116, pp 320 ff. 
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3.3 The Pregabalin Judgments 
3.3.1 Background 
Warner-Lambert Co. LLC (“Warner-Lambert”), part of the Pfizer group, has 
commenced proceedings in multiple countries in Europe challenging generic 
pregabalin products, claiming infringement in its second medical use 
patent.202 Pregabalin is a pharmaceutical that treats epilepsy, GAD and 
neuropathic pain. Warner-Lambert’s first pregabalin product on the market 
was Lyrica, patent as a first medical use patent in 1993 and expired 2013.203 
In 1997, a second medical use patent was granted for the use of pregabalin 
in a method to treat pain. The patent remains valid, and expires in 2017.204 
 
The EMA granted Lyrica market authorisation for the first time in 2004. 
The authorisation extended to two indications: treatment of GAD and 
epilepsy.205 By 2006, the market authorisation was extended to the treatment 
of neuropathic pain. The data exclusivity on the patent of Lyrica expired in 
July 2014, and due to Warner-Lambert letting the fees for the SPC laps, it 
was free for the generic companies to enter the market by use of skinny 
labelling. Subsequently, Warner-Lambert filed numerous claims all around 
Europe against the generic companies claiming that the generic 
pharmaceuticals infringed the second medical use patent.206  
 
As mentioned, Warner-Lambert filed lawsuits against different generic 
companies around Europe, for example in Denmark, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. In Italy, the Italian Medicine Agency published a 
communiqué on the prescription and the dispensation practices of 
pregabalin, both aimed at the proscribing doctors and pharmacists.207 In 
Spain, the regional health authorities have undertaken measures to protect 
the second medical use patent. For example, Murcia and Catalonia 
published statements stressing that pharmaceuticals had to be prescribed in 
accordance with the summary of product characteristics (“SmPC”).208 The 
following chapter will focus on the British, French and German judgments. 
                                                
202 See Patent EP no 6 641 330, Pregabalin salts. 
203 See Patent EP 0 934 061, Isobutylgaba and its derivatives for the treatment of pain. 
204 See Ibid. It is stated in the summary “The instant invention is a method of using certain 
analogs of glutamic acid and gamma-aminobutyric acid in pain therapy.” 
205 See Centralised Market Authorisation EU/1/04/279/001-025. 
206 See Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Ordonnance de Référé rendu le 26 octobre 
2015 – Warner-Lambert Co LLC, Pfizer Ltd & SAS Pfizer PEE France v SAS Sandoz & 
Sandoz GmbH, N° RG 15/58725 (“Warner-Lambert v Sandoz”). See for an unofficial 
English translation of the judgment: 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxmcmV
uY2hpcGRhbWFnZXN8Z3g6NzI2ZjFhZTEyOTNlNDE0MQ (Warner-Lambert v Sandoz), 
pp 2 ff. 
207 See Ibid pp 5 f. 
208 See Ibid p 6. 
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3.3.2 The United Kingdom 
Actavis was the first generic pharmaceutical company to enter the British 
market with Lecaent, a generic pregabalin pharmaceutical, after the 
expiration of the patent.209 Warner-Lambert brought action against Actavis, 
a dispute that gave rise to multiple judgments on preliminary injunctions 
and infringements, four in total at the present.210  
 
In the United Kingdom, pharmaceuticals are prescribed and dispensed on 
the international non-proprietary name (“INN”), not indication. The 
prescription does not identify the product to be dispensed but the 
pharmaceutical substance. Consequently, a pharmacist may dispense 
Lecaent for the treatment of pain even if the SmPC does not contain the 
indication for it. Pharmacists are only obliged to dispense the branded 
product if specified in the prescription. However, pharmacists are strongly 
advised to prescribe on the INN, and the pharmacists will then dispense the 
cheapest pharmaceutical.211 The pharmacist is compensated by the 
difference between the cost of the dispensed pharmaceutical and the NHS’s 
reimbursement of the branded medicament under the Drug Tariff scheme.212 
 
In a preliminary judgment, the first instance tried to define the test for the 
concept of “for”. The judge held that “proof of subjective intent on the part 
of the manufacturer” was required in order to determine an infringement. 
The Court of Appeal eased the test stating that it was enough to establish 
that the manufacturer knew or could have “reasonably foreseen” that the 
product would be used in a patent infringing manner.213 
 
In the most recent judgment, Generics (UK) Ltd (t/a Mylan) v Warner-
Lambert Co. LLC,214 the justice of the High Court of Justice, the 
Honourable Sir Justice Richard Arnold (”Arnold J”), hesitantly applied the 
test of the Court of Appeal. Doing so, Arnold J applied a narrow 
interpretation to the “intentional use” as stated by the Court of Appeal. 
Foreseeability was not enough, but it had to be shown that the generic 
product would be intentionally administered by, in this case, the prescribing 
doctor or the dispensing pharmacist in order to infringe the second medical 
use patent. As a finishing tribute, Sir Arnold J further held that it was not 
enough with the intent of the doctor and the pharmacist. The intention had 
to be tied to the manufacturer of the generic pharmaceutical in order to 
affect if deemed to be an infringement or not.  
 
                                                
209  See Warner-Lambert Company, LLC v Actavis Group Ptc EHF & Others [2015] 
EWCA Civ 556 the Court of Appeal [2015] EWCA Civ 556 (“Warner-Lambert v 
Actavis“), [6]; [8]. 
210 See e.g. Warner-Lambert Company, LLC v Actavis Group Ptc EHF & Others [2015] 
EWHC 72 (Pat); and Generics (UK) Limited t/a Mylan v Warner-Lambert Company LLC 
[2015] EWHC 2548 (Pat) (”Generics v Warner-Lambert”). 
211 See Warner-Lambert v Actavis, supra n 207, [11]. 
212 See Ibid [12]; [13]. 
213 See Ibid [114]; [122]. 
214 See Generics v Warner-Lambert, supra n 210. 
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3.3.3 France  
In the recent case, dated 13 October 2015, Warner-Lambert filed for a 
preliminary injunction against Sandoz, a multinational generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturer.215 The dispute arose when market 
authorisation for a generic pharmaceutical to Lyrica was granted to Sandoz. 
The indication for pain treatment remained carved out with the product 
specified and authorised for the treatment of epilepsy and GAD.216 Warner-
Lambert filed a suit against Sandoz claiming an infringement of the second 
medical use patent.217  
 
During the preparation for litigation, Sandoz published an announcement 
directed to the French pharmaceutical industry, mainly directed to 
pharmacists and proscribing doctors, informing them of the patent 
infringement of Warner-Lambert’s patent they would commit if proscribing 
and dispensing Sandoz product for the treatment of pain instead of the 
patent protected product.218 However, Warner-Lambert was not satisfied and 
persisted in their claim that the generic medicament had to be limited in 
supply to the market.219 
 
The judge came to the finding that, in the light of the notice, there could not 
be a direct or indirect infringement. The court agreed with Sandoz stating 
that “a potential infringement should be assessed objectively, not 
subjectively”.220 Warner-Lambert had not denied the granted market 
authorisation due to the carve out by the EMA or that Sandoz sent the 
announcement to the industry.221 Due to the information sent both by Pfizer, 
as a message to the health authorities to alert them of the rights under the 
valid patent, and by Sandoz, no direct infringement of Pfizer’s right could 
have been conducted.222 
 
The judge concluded that the national legislation governing prescription and 
substitution of pharmaceuticals could not automatically lead to an 
infringement of a patent right, especially not in the situation “where a 
second medical use patent has been granted for an API, offering it 
protection, when the previous indications for the same API are in the public 
domain.”223 The court furthermore pointed out that it could not be a 
responsibility of Sandoz to contact the health authorities to alert them of the 
rights stemming from the valid second medical use patent. It is up to the 
patent holder to alert the authorities of such rights. That is why the right 
                                                
215 See Warner-Lambert v Sandoz, supra n 206. 
216 See Ibid p 2. 
217 See Ibid pp 7 ff. 
218 See Ibid pp 12 f. 
219 See Ibid p 13. 
220 See Ibid p 21. 
221 See Ibid p 16. 
222 See Ibid p 20. 
223 See Ibid p 23. 
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holder is informed when a generic pharmaceutical is granted market 
authorisation.224 Accordingly, Sandoz was not liable of any infringement.225 
 
3.3.4 Germany 
Germany has taken a different approach to the infringement issue in the 
dispute. Whilst the case law on direct infringement is well established, with 
the recognised principle of “sinnfällige Herrichtung” (i.e. “manifestly 
arranged”), the issue of indirect infringements remains disputed.  
  
The principle of “manifestly arranged” stems from rulings by the Düsseldorf 
district court, and has been upheld by German Court of Appeal decisions.226 
The concept of “manifestly arranged” requires a close link between the 
purpose of use and the manner of the marketing of the product. For 
example, the marketing of generic pharmaceutical by meetings or flyers is 
not fulfilling the requirements of manifest arrangement.227 
 
In April 2015, the District Court of Hamburg made a ruling in four 
preliminary injunction proceedings on pregabalin and indirect infringement 
of Warner-Lambert’s second medical use patent. The companies had 
participated in a public procurement procedure for the API of pregabalin. In 
Germany, pharmaceutical products can be legally substitutable if both 
products are authorised in one identical indication. Substitution is strongly 
advised by the German public health insurances due to budget control 
reasons. After conducting procurements in accordance with EU public 
procurement law, the public health insurances may enter into rebate 
agreements with pharmaceutical companies. The exclusive agreement 
stemming from such procurement proceedings obliges the pharmacists to 
exchange the prescribed pharmaceutical product and dispense the product 
that won the tender, if it is not the product proscribed by the doctor.228  
 
None of the generic companies had clarified that the generic pharmaceutical 
products were skinny labels and could not be dispensed for treatment of 
neuropathic pain, since protected by Warner-Lambert’s second medical use 
patent. The Warner-Lambert proceeding against Aliud Pharma GmbH 
(“Aliud”) will be utilised as an example.229 
 
                                                
224 See Ibid p 23. 
225 See Ibid pp 23 f. 
226 See Düsseldorf District Court, docket number 4a 0 12/03, 24 February 2004, GRUR-RR 
2004, 193 – Ribavirin; Düsseldorf Court of Appeal, docket number 2 U 54/11, 31 January 
2013 – Cistus Incanus (“Düsseldorf Court of Appeal - Cistus Incanus”); Düsseldorf District 
Court, docket number 4a O 145/12, 14 March 2013 – Chronic Hepatitis C (“Düsseldorf 
district court - Chronic Hepatitis C”). 
227 Compare Düsseldorf Court of Appeal - Cistus Incanus, supra n 226, with Düsseldorf 
district court - Chronic Hepatitis C, supra n 226. 
228 See ”Infringement of second medical use patents – important developments in 
Germany” by Anja Lunze for Tylor Wessing, September 2015. 
229 See District court Hamburg, supra n 197. 
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Aliud had entered into a discount agreement with the health insurance 
provider, “AOK PLUS – The Health Insurance Company for Saxony and 
Thuringia” (“AOK”), for its pregabalin product.  The agreement was not 
expressively limited to the off-patent protected indication of epilepsy and 
GAD. Furthermore, Aliud entered into the agreement without informing 
AOK at any stage that the generic product did not extend to the use of 
neuropathic pain due to the valid second medical use patent.230  
 
The district court of Hamburg held that Aliud had committed an indirect 
infringement of the second medical use patent by entering into the 
procurement procedure with a generic product without expressively stating 
that it was limited to the off-patented use to AOK. The fact that the patented 
indication had been carved out did not matter since the wording of the 
agreement did not mirror such a limitation.231 By the wording of the 
agreement, the generic product was marketable and would be prescribed for 
the patented use. Consequently, Aliud had undertaken to offer and supply 
the generic pharmaceutical for the patent protected indication. The court 
further emphasised that Aliud had not informed AOK that their 
pharmaceutical was not to be dispensed for the treatment of neuropathic 
pain as such indication was protected by the second medical use patent.232 
 
The Hamburg district court explicitly deviated from the rulings of the 
Düsseldorf courts. The Düsseldorf district court had held that the distinctive 
purpose-limited character of second medical use claims required that the 
substance would be “manifestly arranged” in order for it to infringe the 
patent.233 The Hamburg court disagreed and stated that “manifestly 
arranged” was not a requirement, the mere fact that the substance had been 
offered or supplied was enough to constitute an indirect infringement.234  
 
In conclusion, the Hamburg district court held that it is prohibited for a 
generic company to enter into a rebate agreement stemming from a 
procurement procedure without clearly informing the German public health 
insurances that it may not be dispensed for the indications, which are 
protected by the valid second medical use patent.235 
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234 See Ibid p 21. 
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4 Discussion  
4.1 Introduction 
The discussion will take its start in analysing the AstraZeneca judgement 
and Article 102 TFEU in a combined scrutiny of EU competition law, 
followed by a discussion on second medical use patents and generic 
pharmaceutical products. Such a discussion will to a start scrutinise the EPC 
2000 claim and its effect on skinny labelling, and then proceed to discuss 
the pregabalin judgments. A general discussion will conclude the Chapter 
on the both areas of law and an analysis of the questions as posed above.  
 
4.2 Competition law and the AstraZeneca 
judgment 
The objective of EU competition law is to keep the internal market 
undistorted. The aim is to establish a strong single market that safeguards 
the consumers’ rights. The objective of patent law is to protect the patent 
holder’s rights and stimulate inventions. At the same time as Article 102 
TFEU prohibits abuse of dominance, Article 36 TFEU safeguards the rights 
of a patent holder.  
 
In order for Article 102 TFEU to apply, the pharmaceutical company must 
be deemed to be a dominant undertaking on the relevant market.  The 
company must have the economic strength to prevent effective competition 
and be able to behave, to an appreciable extent, independently on the 
market. A pharmaceutical company whose previous product was patent 
protected must be assumed to be in a dominant position in the time-period 
close to the expiry of that patent. That company has been enjoying a 
monopoly position on the market prior to the expiry, which definitely 
affects the market structure on the future market. On that note, it is 
interesting to acknowledge the structure of the pharmaceutical market. The 
market is characterised by the non-existence of medium-sized companies, 
and a situation where multinational companies are competing against each 
other with small-sized companies trying to develop and grow in a hostile 
environment.  
 
The products that are substitutable with the products of the dominant 
undertaking constitute the relevant market. On the same note, 
pharmaceuticals are normally substitutable on the API or a special 
ingredient. Such substitutability results in that the SSNIP test, if applied, 
would include all generic products in the relevant product market due to the 
lesser cost per product. However, it is this kind of interchange of products 
that the patent law is supposed to, and does, prevent. The main argument in 
most infringement disputes on pharmaceutical patents is that the medicinal 
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products are substitutable. Such an argument is very interesting in a 
competition law perspective, since it is the substitutability that defines the 
relevant product market. By such an argument posed by the claimant, the 
relevant market must be deemed as expanded from the normally narrow 
interpretation of pharmaceutical products market. Hence, such market 
should include both the market of the generic product and the market of the 
second medical use patented product. 
 
The AstraZeneca judgment is the currently leading precedence on the 
intersection of competition law and patent law. The judgment touches upon 
multiple issues, such as the misuse of the exclusive rights stemming from 
patent law. In conclusion, the judgment establishes that an unlawful conduct 
under competition laws cannot be excused by the lawfulness of the conduct 
under another field of law. It affirms that EU competition law prevails over 
other fields of law, such as patent law, if such a law has been used in order 
to abuse a dominant position and foreclose the market.  
 
Is the judgment too far reaching? The treaties that protect patent holders’ 
rights and patent law are explicitly exempted from the realm of competition 
law according to Article 36 TFEU. However, Article 36 TFEU only 
exempts the intellectual property rights in the regard of quantitative 
restrictions. The act of a pharmaceutical company to prevent the market 
entry of a generic company to the market is not a quantitative restriction, but 
an abusive conduct aimed to distort competition. The wording of Article 36 
TFEU cannot exempt an intellectual property right if conducted as an 
abusive act, and if in the fashion that renders Article 102 TFEU applicable. 
The Court states that an unlawful conduct under competition law could 
never be forgiven by the lawfulness under another law. This ultimately leads 
to that a lawful act can be unlawful by object.  
 
AstraZeneca had abused the system of patent law by the withdrawal of the 
product from the Nordic market. The sole purpose according to the Court, 
and AstraZeneca could not prove otherwise, was to hinder or delay generic 
products of entering. It would be significantly harder and more time 
consuming than expected for the generic companies to establish themselves 
on the market, since AstraZeneca withdrew a reference medicinal product. 
The interesting aspect is that AstraZeneca had utilised its right to withdraw 
the market authorisation as stipulated in EU directives and in accordance 
with national law. AstraZeneca had abused legislative acts of the EU in 
order to foreclose the market for a little longer than allowed by the patent. In 
simple, the judgment holds that it is the intent of the use of the provisions, 
not the provisions themselves, which constitutes the abusive conduct.  
 
Abuse of dominance is one of the most severe violations of EU competition 
law. Even if there is a theoretical possibility for the Court to exempt a 
conduct from the applicability of Article 102 TFEU, no party accused of 
infringement of the provision has up until this date been able to prove the 
abuse objectively justified before the CJEU. The burden of proof rests upon 
the alleged party. The efficiency gains stemming from such an abuse must 
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be great enough to overweight the loss of competition caused by the 
allowance. The relevant loss in question is the loss of the consumers; the 
loss of the competitors is irrelevant. The foreclosure of the market would 
lead to raised costs for the consumers, lesser variation in supply of products 
on the market and stagnation in improvements of the product. The concept 
of efficiency gains is interpreted strictly and narrowly. The requirement of 
proportionality, the necessity of the conduct to achieve the positive effect 
and that it still cannot eliminate effective competition renders it hard for a 
pharmaceutical company holding a patent to the market to successfully 
argue its case of objective justification before the CJEU. However, the fact 
that the Commission has won all cases against companies on objective 
justifications should be reason enough to reflect if the test should be 
modified in order to be more well-balanced. 
 
Competition on the merits is the key issue. The mere fact that AstraZeneca 
was entitled to withdraw its marketing authorisation of Losec, and had legal 
support for such an action in the Medicinal product directive, did not mean 
that such an action was not deemed to be abusive. As held by the Court, 
AstraZeneca’s strategy was rather clear, it meant to foreclose competitors 
from the market for as long as possible. It can be argued that the 
AstraZeneca judgment is an example of the greatness of competition law. If 
the other legal document is contravening the objective of Article 102 TFEU, 
they have to give way for the dominance of Article 102 TFEU and 
competition law. Competition law could punish the faulting company 
effectively, even if it faulted under another law by misrepresentation to 
governmental offices. This is true. Competition law is one of the most 
important areas of law within the EU and it is highly enforceable, in 
comparison to other fields of law. Its importance stems from that it is 
regarded as the guard of the internal market, which is the basic foundation 
of the EU as a whole. By the inclusion of Article 101 and 102 TFEU as 
primary law of the EU, competition law has been given a superior role. 
Primary law prevails all other norms, which is why it will be interesting to 
see how the balance of competition law and patent law will be conducted 
when the patent court and the regulation enters into force.  
 
4.3  The balance of second medical use 
patents and skinny labelling 
4.3.1 The EPC 2000 claim and a skinny label 
Patent law is the law of inventions, the law that protects development and 
prevents stagnation. Pharmaceutical patents form a different genre than 
other areas of technology in which inventions usually are patented. It is a 
unique field of patents that need, due to development and new discoveries, 
specially designed provisions ensuring its protection and custom made 
regulations that encourag new ground breaking discoveries.  
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The Swiss type claim stems from the need of legal certainty and guidance of 
the EPO. The main problem with this type of claim was that the patent 
holder only could bring action against a manufacturer or dealer, but was 
ineffective if the infringer would be any other actor on the market.  
 
The majority of claims brought to court by lawsuits are still Swiss type 
claims, even if the Boards of Appeals officially does not approve of such 
claims after the G 2/08 ruling. There is an uncertainty on how the case law 
on Swiss type claims shall be assessed in the light of the new form of 
claims. All pregabalin judgments referred to and analysed below are Swiss 
type claim judgments. The Boards of Appeals held in the T 1780/12 ruling 
that the scope of protection was similar but not identical. In the light of 
competition law, the variance between the two may make a whole of a 
difference in the analysis of the effect on competition and the internal 
market.  
 
Skinny labelling is in its basics a very simple solution to a complicated 
problem that arose by the approval of second medical use patents. A generic 
product, launched with a skinny label, is not by object infringing a patent. 
The carve out of the relevant patent protected indication from the label 
guarantees competition on the market of the reference medicinal product, 
and that the patent of the second medical use product remains honoured.  
 
The scope of the new type of second medical use patent claims directly 
effect the generic product. If the claims are given a broader protection, the 
scope within which the generic product is operating will be narrowed in 
order for the generic not to commit a patent infringement. In a situation 
where the scope of the second medical use patent is deemed to be broader, 
the generic product could easily be accused of patent infringement if actions 
of caution are not undertaken. This would result in more lawsuits and 
inevitably more infringements. On the other hand, if the EPC 2000 claim 
would be deemed to be slightly narrower compared to the Swiss type claim, 
the generic would have a better protection against actions of patent 
infringements from of the second medical use patent holder. The question 
that needs to be settled is who the object to protect should be. Is it the patent 
holder or the generic company? This is a balance between the right to 
intellectual property weight against the right to conduct business, and will 
be discussed in the following subchapters below.  
 
The two different types of patent claims are interrelated and their affection 
for one and another is immense. The scope of protection does not only 
affect the two concepts but also the effect that competition law might have 
on the issue. Consequently, the triangular complexity of problem is why it is 
of utter importance to define the scope of the now existing EPC 2000 claim. 
The issue has higher importance than most might understand. It is a 
discussion of legal certainty and the right to property, a basic fundamental 
human right.  
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A balance must be struck between the claims stemming from the second 
medical use patent right and the generic products’ right after the carve out of 
the relevant indication. It can be argued that the mere carve out of the 
protected indication from the label should be enough to safeguard the 
generic company from any lawsuits based on infringement of the patent. It 
can be argued that such an action by the generic company effectively states 
that it does not intend to infringe the second medical use patent. However, 
with the new wording in place of patent claims worded as “substance X for 
the treatment of Y”, and the uncertainty how to interpret the new wording 
has lead to an ambiguity that is most disturbing considering the legal 
certainty for all parties involved. Furthermore, the current situation is 
marked by the fact that one action might be considered lawful in one 
Member State but infringing patent rights in another. Europe 2020 
articulates strive for development and a scare for stagnation. The legal 
uncertainty causes such stagnation and hamper the internal market. 
 
4.3.2 The Pregabalin judgments 
The three studied judgments from Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom are interesting on their own, but even more so if scrutinised and 
discussed in a comparison. The national courts of the three jurisdictions all 
reached different results when tackling the complex of the issue of skinny 
labelling and second medical use patents, and awards the responsibility to 
different actors.  
 
The Generic v Warner-Lambert judgment from the United Kingdom is the 
most discussed adjudication of the three by scholars and practitioners. In the 
end, the case examined the requirements of the test to establish direct 
infringements in second medical use patent. Pharmaceuticals are dispensed 
on the API in United Kingdom, and enrolled in a reimbursement scheme. 
The Court of First Instance set the criteria low, and required only that 
subjective intent had to be shown. The High Court of Justice refused such a 
narrow interpretation and widened the scope to “intentional use”.  
 
The High Court of Justice decided to interpret the test as stipulated by the 
Court of Appeal more narrowly, and consequently required more of the 
patent holder to prove an infringement in the second medical use patent. The 
test comprises the foreseeability, on the part of the manufacturer, that the 
product will be used in a manner that infringes the patent. However, Arnold 
J added that foreseeability was not enough; it had to be shown that the 
pharmaceutical was intentionally administered and that such administration 
could be tied to the manufacturer. Arnold J found there to be no 
foreseeability or intentional administration that could constitute an 
infringement. The stand taken by Arnold J is a well-balanced stand that 
safeguards legal certainty and protects competition on the merits. 
Interestingly, Arnold J states in clear wording that Pfizer is liable for 
groundless threats of patent infringement proceedings. 
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The French court had a slightly different take on the case it adjudicated. The 
court ruled on both the direct and indirect infringement by Sandoz in 
Warner-Lamberts second medical use patent, since the facts of the case were 
different in comparison to the two other cases. Sandoz decided to publish 
statements advising no dispensation or prescription of its generic product for 
the use of pain. This was the tipping point for the French court. It is clear 
that it made a difference by the statements all through the judgment. The 
court further stated that the national law of substitution and prescription 
practices could not automatically lead to a patent infringement, especially 
not when it concerned the problematic situation of the reference medicinal 
product being in the public domain, but a still valid second medical use 
patent. By such a statement the French court, even if unknowingly, 
acknowledges the importance of competition law and a functioning of the 
market. The court further underlined that messages had been sent by both 
Sandoz and Pfizer (as the head of the corporate group that Warmer-Lambert 
belongs to), but that it was up to the patent-holder to inform the 
governmental offices and health authorities of the patent infringement that a 
dispensation of the generic product would constitute. The French court, 
subsequently, burdened the patent holder with the responsibility of 
informing relevant disposers of the potential infringement.  
 
The judgment by the German court is the least covered, but might be the 
most interesting. The Hamburg district court explicitly deviated from the 
previously established case law and refrained from the test of whether or not 
the dispensation had been “manifestly arranged”. The mere fact that the 
substance had been offered and supplied to the market was enough to 
constitute an infringement according to the Hamburg court. Actions were 
brought against Aliude and a number of other generic companies by 
Warner-Lambert, due to the award of procurement contracts to the generic 
companies for pregabalin. The main issue was that the generic companies 
had not declared that their products could not be dispensed for the patent 
protected indication. The Germany system approved of substitution on a 
substance level, and substitution was advised by health authorities and 
insurance companies in order to keep the costs low.  
 
Authorities purchase pharmaceutical products through public procurement 
procedures. EU directives, as described above, regulate these procedures 
rather intensively and afford the aggrieved party effective remedies. Such a 
system is the most effective way to keep costs low and safeguard 
competition. In the German pregabalin judgment, a procurement procedure 
and the award of the contract to a generic company was the starting point of 
the dispute. The conclusion is actually understandable and logic. By 
entering into a contract with no limitation on dispensation of the product, 
knowing that it was most likely to be substituted with a patented product, it 
is hard to not find Aliud’s behaviour offensive, almost as offensive as an 
abuse of dominance. The interesting aspect of the dispute is Warner-
Lambert’s strategy to not attack the procurement procedure but rather the 
generic company’s infringement of the second medical use patent by the 
mere participation in procurement procedure.  
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The Hamburg court held that the mere offer and supply to the market was 
enough for an infringement. However, according to public procurement law, 
a procurement offer must be disregarded if it does not fulfil the selection 
criteria in the procurement. In order for the generic company to win the 
procurement procedure the criteria must have been, conclusively, set and 
met in a manner that the award of contract to the generic company did not 
directly infringe the second medical use patent. For example, if the criteria 
required that the product comprised of the API of pregabalin, the generic 
company could enter the tender and be awarded the contract. On the other 
hand, the generic product would have been disqualified if the criteria 
required the product to be dispensable for all indications of the API. In 
conclusion, the criteria cannot have been specified enough to preclude 
products infringing the second medical use patent. But was the procurement 
procedure intended to cover only products for pain treatment or actually all 
the indications that pregabalin covers? To refuse a generic company’s entry 
to a procurement procedure on the mere ground of the existence of a second 
medical use patent would be disproportionate, render the procedure non-
transparent and discriminatory. Furthermore, it would safeguard a monopoly 
for second medical use patent holder on the market for the API acquired. If 
that would be the judgment, all generic products would be refused by their 
nature as generic products from all tender procedures. The public 
procurement procedure is an important source of income for the 
pharmaceutical companies, and a direct exclusion form such procedures 
would render their business more or less ineffective. 
 
The reason for the publishing of information on the Italian health 
authorities’ website, or the active actions taken by some regions in Spain 
against the prescription of generic pregabalin is not publically known. 
Consequently, such announcements by the authorities in mentioned 
countries cannot be used as a ground to require the generic company to 
inform all relevant authorities of a potential infringement of the second 
medical use patent if dispensed for the use as protected by such. The general 
rule in patent law is that it is for the patent holder to enforce its patent when 
infringed by another party. It would be odd if this general rule would be 
literally reversed in regard to second medical use patents. An owner of a 
second medical use patent has been granted a protection by exemption from 
the basic principle of patent law, namely, novelty. Such an exemption from 
the general rule must be interpreted narrowly. To burden the generic 
company of informing all authorities of the patent protected second medical 
use patent’s existence seems disproportionate. A generic company cannot be 
expected to assume that neither the authorities has informed themselves of 
the structure of the market within which they are active, nor that the patent 
owner safeguards its patent rights. It is a backwards argument that the 
Hamburg court is advocating. At the same time, the Hamburg court refuses 
the concept of “manifestly arranged” and states that the mere supply and 
offer to the market is an infringement of the patent holder’s right. Such an 
argument is unbalanced and directly contravenes all that competition law 
stand for.  
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The French court managed to balance the conflict between the two areas of 
law in a more proficient manner. The court pointed out that the matter had 
to be assessed objectively. Warner-Lambert had not objected to the market 
authorisation of the generic product. However, this argument might fall out 
a bit strange, since Sandoz had launched its product with a skinny label. The 
contest of the market authorisation by Warner-Lambert would consequently 
both trespass its’ rights given under patent law and infringe competition law 
by abuse of dominance. The French court faulted in not acknowledging the 
complexity of this problem, but stood correct in the assessment of Sandoz 
announcement to the industry. Warner-Lambert was informed of what kind 
of information that Sandoz had sent to the relevant authorities and parties 
within the sector, and could have contested it at any point. By burdening the 
patent holder with the responsibility to inform authorities and pharmacists, a 
more proficient balance is found, especially in comparison to the judgment 
by the Hamburg court. However, it must be remembered that the generic 
company had sent out messages by own free will during the proceedings in 
order to inform relevant third parties of the potential infringement a 
dispensation to treat pain of the product might result in. Arguably, Sandoz 
actively strived to minimise the damage caused to Warner-Lambert. It 
remains uncertain how the French court would assess the dispute if such a 
message would not have been sent to affected parties. However, it could be 
assumed, when assessing the formulations in the judgment, that the 
language would not be as tough as the Hamburg court’s. 
 
The pregabalin disputes arising all around in Europe is just one example of 
disputes between second medical use patent holders and generic companies. 
In the end, it is a discussion on the balance of two fundamental human 
rights: the right to business and the right to property. The two principles are 
fundamental values of the Union and with Europe 2020 as an underlying 
document the balancing of the two might be more complicated than a simple 
application of the AstraZeneca judgment to the problem.  
 
The French court came to a well-balanced and well-thought decision. It 
managed to reach a balance between both the judgment from the United 
Kingdom and the German court. As mentioned, it is uncertain how the 
verdicts would have been worded if Sandoz did not publish the information, 
but the court did apply an objective test to the situation where both the right 
holders and the generic companies interest was weighted against each other.  
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4.4 The balance of patent protection, 
generic companies’ sale and EU 
competition law 
The Paris Convention arose from the strive to harmonise the patent laws 
around the world, in order to stimulate invention by better and a more 
aligned patent protection. The existence of multiple different systems was 
argued inefficient and confusing. More than a 100 years later, EU still has 
not been able to align its patent law or harmonised it even if the attempt to 
do so has been on-going for decades. 
 
The lack of a EU system will potentially be remedied when the Unitary 
Patent Regulation comes into force. The questions remain though: when will 
it come into force, and will its appearance and existence in EU law clarify 
the hierarchy between competition law and patent law? Can the Treaty 
provisions protecting patent rights limit the scope of competition law, if 
there is an actual EU regulation in place to govern such right? Up until the 
enforcement of the Unitary Patent Regulation, the competition law will 
always prevail due to its succession over national patent law provisions.  
 
The pregabalin judgments are proof enough to show that the same type of 
claim can be adjudicated differently depending on which Member State that 
settled the dispute. This is a clear hindrance of free movement and the 
harmonisation of the internal market. Patent law is the foundation for 
invention, but can also constitute a hindrance to competition if abused. The 
possibility for a generic product to be launched on the market is a 
reasonable balance to the allowance of a second medical use patent to be 
allowed.  
 
Article 118(1) TFEU prescribes that the EU shall provide a uniform 
protection for intellectual property rights. The EU has obviously failed with 
respect to patent law. It is apparent from the case law from different 
Member States that they are handling and adjudicating differently on the 
same subject matter. Article 118 TFEU does not provide any rights to the 
patent holder, merely an obligation on the EU. The sole, and essential, effect 
a proper utilisation of Article 118 TFEU would have is legal certainty: legal 
certainty for the patent holder, generic companies and the authorities 
implementing the rules.  Competition law and patent law will always affect 
each other and tend to restrict each other’s scope. That is why it is of utter 
importance to establish the scope of both fields. However, there will always 
be a grey zone in the intersection of the two. Such a grey zone must be 
diminished, due to legal certainty and protection of the right holders. 
 
The EU pharmaceutical sector is characterised of small businesses versus 
big corporate groups. One could say that it is an imbalanced market where 
the market domination of both multinational pharmaceutical originators and 
generic companies might constitute a problem for the smaller innovative 
companies to grow. The market is characterised by a non-existence of 
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medium-sized companies, since the smaller companies are acquired when 
they earn an all too great market-share. It is a complex market to scrutinize. 
On the one hand, inventions should enjoy a strong protection in order to 
provide a chance for the inventing companies to recapitalise their 
investments. On the other hand, by providing such protection the 
multinational corporations and can exploit the system by treats of patent 
infringement proceedings. Also, a third factor to keep in mind is that 
competition law never will protect the competitor. This cannot be 
emphasised enough. Competition law only strives to ensure that consumer 
harm is minimised.  
 
Consumer harm is minimised by the safeguard of an open and free market 
where competitors can compete on the merits. Monopolies force an increase 
in price and a limited variation in supply of products, which it is deemed as 
harm to consumers. Besides, the safety regulations surrounding 
pharmaceuticals could be considered as barriers to the market, but are a 
necessity to ensure consumer safety. One could argue that patent law and 
regulations on pharmaceuticals in simple protect the aims of the EU, and to 
some extent balance such aims with competition law. Inventors are 
stimulated to innovate by the patent protection, and consumers are 
safeguarded by the market authorisation. At the same time, competitors are 
allowed market entry at the date of the expiry of the patent and afforded a 
market authorisation by simplified procedure by allusion to the reference 
medicinal product. Such a balance between the two interests must be 
considered as proportionate. The Unified Patent Court will hopefully be able 
to establish guiding case law, balancing the values of the EU in a sensible 
manner so that neither patent law or competition law is concerned and 
disregarded in its importance. This will be a difficult task for the Unified 
Patent Court, forcing the court to take an active stand in the discussion and 
try to clarify the hierarchy of the two areas of law.  
 
Everything will not be settled by the Unitary Patent Regulation or the 
Unified Patent Court and their entry into effect. However, both these 
instruments will be instruments of EU law. They will provide a harmonising 
effect in a now shattered system of multiple national legislations, and unify 
EU to a more effective system. The judgments adjudicated in the court will 
be ruled in accordance with EU law and questions will be referred to the 
CJEU for review if required by a party. Furthermore, the court will be 
bound by the precedent of the CJEU, and consequently have to take the 
realm of EU law into consideration when delivering their judgments.  
 
The Unified Patent Court cannot only regard the principles of patent law 
and competition law when conducting such a test of norm hierarchy. It must 
take into account the policy documents of the EU, such as Europe 2020, and 
accredit the CFREU. How far do the generic companies’ rights to conduct 
business stretch and how far-reaching are the second medical use patents?  
 
The right to launch products with a skinny label is a direct articulation of the 
right to conduct business. Consequently, when debating the existence of 
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skinny labelling and second medical use patents it all falls back to the 
general principles of competition law, and on the fundamental human rights. 
Competition law and patent law coexist in the realm of EU law, and even 
more so after the establishing of the Unitary Patent Regulation.  
 
The factual situation in the pregabalin judgments, where the second medical 
use patent holder is the originator of the reference medicinal product, is a 
typical situation in disputes on second medical use patent infringements. 
Ultimately, by the threat of infringement proceedings or an actual lawsuit 
against the generic company, the originator tries to prolong and extend its 
second medical use patent to establish a monopoly in whole or in part on the 
API. Second medical use patents are the exemption to general rules in patent 
law, it is an expansion of novelty that is only accepted due to the unique 
character of pharmaceutical patents and the importance such patents play for 
development. The EPO has decided to take an ambiguous stand and settled 
the EPC 2000 claim to be similar but not identical in scope compared to the 
Swiss type claims. Such ambiguity is the main problem in deciding the 
actual rights of the patent holders but also of the generic companies.  
 
The EPO held in the G 2/08 decision that second medical use patents could 
be granted on the same illness as the first medical use patent if utilised in a 
different type of treatment, and that the mere change of the dosage regime 
could be enough to establish new state of art. This allows the inventor to 
patent discoveries that are close to similar to the first medical patent or other 
already existing second medical use patents. Consequently, the EPO has 
granted the concept of second medical use a broad definition by the 
establishing of the new EPC 2000 claims. One could argue that such a broad 
interpretation should lead to a narrow scope of the actual patent, in order not 
to intrude other patented indications.  
 
All authorities and institutions around the EU must actively discourage the 
misuse and abuse of patent law. It is not acceptable that a Member State 
allows such a conduct, which could be argued prohibited by analogy to the 
AstraZeneca judgment even if the judgment only rules on the facts of the 
case. As explained above, most second medical use patent holders are the 
right holders of the reference medicinal product as well. Such a link 
between the two products established a natural interest of the owner in the 
markets of the two products, especially when the two are substitutable with 
each other. The substitutability of the patented product and the generic 
product has been emphasised by the patent holders in their suits against the 
generic companies as establishing infringement. However, by making such a 
claim, patent holders indirectly violates competition law and abuses their 
dominant position on the market.  
 
The patent holder utilises its dominance, as provided by the patent, to force 
a generic company to exit the market for a product to which the patent 
holder does not have an exclusive right. Such dominance, in relation to 
second medical use patents, normally expresses itself in aggressive 
infringement proceedings. The aggressive litigation style is problematic, 
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since the patent holder, arguably, is merely protecting its right to the 
patented product whilst it actually creates a monopoly on the API in the 
long run. The problem gets especially complicated when the patent holder 
questions the right of the generic company to enter a procurement 
procedure. Simply put, it is the procurement procedure that infringes the 
second medical use patent if the criteria are asking for an API, without 
specification or limitation regarding valid patents, not the participating 
tenderer. It could be argued that Warner-Lambert should, instead of 
commencing infringement proceedings against the generic companies, claim 
nullification of the award of contract to the generic company and damages 
due to patent infringement by the government. Such a claim would have 
been aligned with competition law.  
 
Competition law has been established as a supreme field of EU law, and any 
abusive conduct can be challenged by the Commission and adjudicated by 
the Court. It is disturbing that the Hamburg court disregards, not only, this 
regime of law that is indirectly applicable, but also the issue of competition 
on the merits. This is especially noteworthy in contrast to Arnold J’s explicit 
statement that such claims were groundless threats. The generic companies 
have launched their products after the grant of market authorisation by the 
authorities, by carving out the patented indication from their labels. Such 
carve out does not constitute any potential harm to the consumer, as it also 
provides an efficient competition on the market.  
 
Then again, a property owner’s right to its property is a fundamental human 
right, as drafted into CFREU and further pointed out in the treaties. 
Invention is held to be one of the most important values to safeguard in 
order to stimulate investments in EU. The development of the Unitary 
Patent Regulation further enhances this. Are the general principles as stated 
in preambles of regulations and Treaties establishing patent rights as claims 
valuable enough to protect against the realm of competition law? If the 
AstraZeneca judgment is followed literally the answer is no. However, the 
Court was rather obvious in pointing out that it mainly made fact-based 
statements and did not establish any general principles as such. However, it 
is hard to overlook the fact that they rather harshly enforced competition law 
as the superior law of the laws of the EU. 
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5 Conclusion 
Europe 2020 is a political document setting up the goals, which forms the 
policy-making and the aim of the EU in general. It is clear from this 
document that there need to be a balancing of rights, the right to business 
and the right to property. 
 
The EPC 2000 claim has intensified the discussion on second medical use 
patents and their enforceability, at the same time as patent litigations on 
second medical use patents has emerged all around Europe. The scope, 
similar but not identical to the Swiss type claim, remains disputed. Its scope 
is interconnected with the generic companies possibility to act on the 
relevant market of the reference medicinal product. The right to conduct 
business is countered against the right to property. Equilibrium must be 
found between the two in order for the EU to prosper. Both areas of law are 
of great importance of the EU, even if competition law shall be considered 
to set the outer framework. A framework to which second medical use 
patent holder need to adapt.   
 
There must be a balance between competition law and patent law. The 
problem is that most national courts do not acknowledge that there is a 
potential conflict between the two fields of law, or that the two might 
directly affect each other. The intersection of competition and patent law 
might be one of the most important norm conflicts within EU law and it is 
important that the courts realise their connection.  
 
Competition law has been given superior status within the EU norm 
hierarchy. The internal market is the Holy Grail of EU and competition law 
is its faithful guard. Intellectual property right is the only field of conflicting 
law that has been exempted from the reach of competition law by the 
stipulation of Article 36 TFEU. On the one hand, competition law is a 
fundamental component of the functioning of the internal market; on the 
other hand, patent law is a vital component to build an innovative Union 
that stimulates investments. The two fields of law must be able to coexist in 
order for the EU to functioning and be competitive on the global arena.  
 
Invention would be hampered if the patent protection of a second medical 
use product were to be expanded to broadly. Exemptions are normally to be 
applied with a narrow and literal interpretation and to expand the second 
medical use patent protection to broadly cannot be accepted. Such an 
expansion would jeopardise competition on the merits, make way for a 
potential monopoly, stagnate the market and harm consumers, competition 
and invention. That is why competition law must be the supreme field of 
law. Competition law creates dynamic marketplaces; it safeguards 
competition on the merits and forces the companies competing on the 
market to be effective and innovative in order to be able to compete.  
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Skinny labelling is the equilibrium of competition law and patent law. The 
values of the EU are balanced by the acceptance of skinny labelling, and 
competition law ensured. One could argue that skinny labelling actually 
stimulates invention and development. By letting a generic product enter the 
market of a previously patent protected indication and expose the product to 
competition, the right owner to the product will have to adjust and be more 
creative in its take on the market in order to be effective enough to compete. 
This normally takes the expression in further research and studies on the 
API in order to find a new indication to apply for a patent on.  Skinny 
labelling provides the legal certainty necessary in an elsewise uncertain 
system of law. Consequently, the generic companies forces the 
pharmaceutical companies that are focused on invention to further develop 
the sector and continuously strive to find new treatments for diseases. 
Ultimately, there cannot be any objective justifications for a pharmaceutical 
company holding a second medical use patent to foreclose a skinny label 
product from the market. The generic manufacturers provide qualitative 
medicinal products to the common public, reduced price and competition on 
the merits. No efficiency gains can stem from a foreclosure of such a 
market, since such an action could never be proportional, the consumer 
would not be given any surplus from such an action, and all effective 
competition would be eliminated not only from one but also from two 
markets.  
 
Consequently, it is of importance to safeguard the concept of skinny 
labelling against attempts to invalidate it or minimise its applicability. To 
attack skinny label generic products by claiming infringement in the second 
medical use product violates not only competition law but also patent law 
regulations. The sole result is that the generic product would be refused 
access to the market of the reference medicinal product. The products are 
substitutable in most Member States, since they are based on the same API, 
but that does not lead to an automatic infringement of the valid patent by the 
generic company. Then again, it should be the responsibility of the patent 
holder to enforce its patent by informing relevant authorities. Authorities 
and pharmacists dispense pharmaceutical products, and consequently, the 
ones that need to be informed of the patent holders exclusive rights to the 
patented indication. However, such an exclusive right to one market cannot 
entitle the patent holder to foreclose the market for competitors to the 
reference medicinal product. To misuse the second medical use patent to the 
extent of foreclosing other markets cannot be deemed as something other 
than an abuse of dominance. How far do the generic companies’ rights to 
conduct business stretch and how far-reaching are the second medical use 
patents? The simple and naïve answer to such question would be that the 
patents right stretches as far as to the limit when it would abuse its dominant 
position and distort competition on the merits.  
 
It all comes down to legal certainty. Legal certainty is the cynosure. The 
certainty of a right holder that the right is enforceable. The certainty of a 
generic company that it will not be fined due to patent infringement after a 
grant of market authorisation. The certainty that companies compete on the 
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merits or elsewise are fined. All these certainties work perfectly in parallel 
systems but reality is not parallel; the reality is an intersection where they all 
three meet and a balance must be struck.  
 
Only the future knows when the Unified Patent Court and the Unitary Patent 
Regulation will enter into effect, and only the future knows what effect a 
harmonising patent regulation will have on the adjudication in the Member 
States. One certain fact is that the CJEU is the superior court in the EU, also 
will be superior to the Unified Patent Court. It is unlikely that it will be long 
after the establishing of the court that the first case on skinny labelling will 
be presented before CJEU, this because skinny labelling is essential to the 
pharmaceutical industry in the EU and to the functioning of the internal 
market. Competition law is the framework within which patent law has to 
find its way of existence. What is clear is that the CJEU was not established 
to protect the competitors, and this will never change. The CJEU was 
established to safeguard the law of the EU and assure that it is implemented 
and enforced correctly. With the judgment of AstraZeneca at hand, it is hard 
to see how the CJEU would come to another conclusion other than that an 
attempt to hinder a generic pharmaceutical product, authorised by use of 
skinny labelling, to enter the market by use of its patent right is an abuse of 
its dominant position on the market.  
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